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The Problem. Of the imposing array of problems facing local 
governments, finance is the most critical. It is a problem which fre¬ 
quently confronts the Mayor of a City, a City Council, or a County Com¬ 
mission when making distribution of limited funds available for support 
of various public services which must be maintained. Such a problem 
arises in planning a city/county budget. Local governments have strug¬ 
gled, frequently with only indifferent success, to provide the wide 
variety of services their citizens are increasingly demanding. All too 
often in the governmental sector, the money is not where the needs are. 
By this, the problem is exacerbated because local governments rely mainly 
on property taxes that are not flexible enough to meet the needs. Because 
the federal government relies heavily on the progressive income tax, its 
revenues grow with the economy much more rapidly than do local revenues. 
Increasingly, therefore, the federal government has the money and the 
local governments have the problem of financing expensive civic services 
with inadequate resources. As a result, there are many deficiencies and 
the costs are heavy, widespread, and often not recognized for what they 
are. 
Because of the lack of funds to adequately render public services, 
local governments have long since turned to the Federal government for 
1 
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additional funds. Traditionally, federal assistance to the governments was 
given in the form of grants-in-aid which were (and some still are) admin¬ 
istered by the national government. However, the present fiscal assistance 
—State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972—will change this. It is 
intended supposedly to simultaneously augment state and local governmental 
fiscal resources and, to a degree, shift control over domestic policy ini¬ 
tiatives in the United States to local officials. That is, under revenue 
sharing, the governors, state legislatures, mayors, county commissioners, 
and city councilmen will determine how federal revenue sharing funds will 
be used instead of various federal agencies. But, because this act re¬ 
places—and in certain areas curtails federal fundings—rather than sup¬ 
plementing conditional grants-in-aid, the state and local governments 
will still be inevitably handicapped financially in one way or another. 
A case in point on the curtailments of federal fundings is the 
grants for social services. The limitation on grants for social services 
under the public assistance programs is the most controversial cutback of 
the present Revenue Sharing Program. It does not refer to General Revenue 
Sharing funds, but to all existing and future federal welfare grants. 
The major provisions of this include: 
1. An annual ceiling of $2.5 billion on federal matching 
grants for state and local welfare departments, with 
each state‘s share determined by population; and 
2. A provision that at least 90 percent of a state's share 
of these funds must be used to aid persons who already 
are on welfare or have applied for payments.1 
^Cernoria D. Johnson, "New Revenue Measure Limits Welfare Grants," 
Urban League News 2 No. 2 (Febuary 1, 1973)! 4. 
3 
This ceiling of $2.5 billion on federal outlays for Social Services is a 
cutback of five billion dollars annually. Because of this oppressive cut¬ 
back, many poor recipients of social services nationally have been forced 
off welfare rolls. Local officials, however, have the authority to sub¬ 
stitute if they desire for this cutback in social spending with Revenue 
Sharing funds, which would help to alleviate the problem. 
In reviewing the literature on the spending of Revenue Sharing 
funds, the national trend seems to indicate that this is not the case. 
There is virtually no substitution of General Revenue Sharing funds for 
the cutback on social services. The Treasury Department analysis of the 
use of Revenue Sharing funds revealed that, 
... in the first six months of operation of the General 
Revenue Sharing program, approximately half of the state and 
local governments in the United States planned and used Reve¬ 
nue Sharing funds to relieve tax pressures.^ 
This report also cast light on how the funds were used within 
(issue) categories during that same entitlement period. Nationally, local 
governments have used by far the largest share—35 percent—for public 
...... *• 
safety. Social services ranked low, with three percent of the funds 
going to that purpose. This evidence clearly shows that local governments, 
on a national level, have used the funds in a discriminatory manner: fa¬ 
voring the ones who do not need the funds (the wealthy and middle classes), 
at the expense of those who do need the funds—the poor. 
Since Revenue Sharing significantly affects both governmental fund¬ 
ing and governmental policy, the question that is germane to this study 
2 
Joint Center for Political Studies, "Revenue Sharing and Housing," 
(Washington, D. C., October 16, 1973)» p. 5. 
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then, is what affects do black mayors, black majority city councils and 
county commissions have on the manner in which Revenue Sharing funds were 
and are going to be spent? Such considerations warrant serious attention 
to evaluation of the pattern of distribution of funds among recipient 
governments and the pattern of policy decisions by those governments in 
the disposition of such funds. This study is a limited attempt at such 
an evaluation. It deals only with selected local governments in the 
States of Alabama and Georgia. Specifically, an answer to this question 
will be sought through a study of the elected officials in Macon County, 
Alabama and Atlanta, Georgia. The choice of these areas carries a num¬ 
ber of advantages. First of all, Macon County shares with many other 
counties many social and economic problems which Revenue Sharing funds 
could be channelled to alleviate. Secondly, Macon County and Atlanta 
were chosen because they offer a unique framework for the exploration 
of questions relating to the spending of Revenue Sharing funds in a 
county (Macon) and a city (Atlanta) controlled by black public officials. 
And thirdly, Macon County was selected because it is the only county in 
Alabama, to my knowledge, that has a black majority county commission, as 
well as a black majority city council and mayor in the county's major 
urban center. 
The chief purpose of this study will be an analysis of the policy 
outcome on the spending of Revenue Sharing funds in Macon County and 
Atlanta, Georgia. That is, analyzing the impact black public officials 
have had on the allocation of Revenue Sharing funds. It will cover only 
the revenue sharing receipts and related spending decisions in the second 
5 
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and third calendar years of the system's operation. An important factor 
in determining policy is the complexity of conflicting values (desired 
goals) evident in communities during the formation of the policy. There 
is no uniformity in either the black or white communities. The black 
public officials are confronted with various ideological groups in both 
the black and white communities. Each community containing within it 
groups seeking to be the decision-making faction of that community when 
they try to get certain goals adopted as the official policy outcome; 
or, when they try to keep others' objectives from surfacing in the 
decision-making arena, and thus from being adopted as the official govern¬ 
mental policy. The key word in both communities is "control": the white 
community's goal is to maintain control, the black community's goal is to 
gain control from the white community. The consequence of this is that 
there tends to be as many decision centers in a community as there are 
important decision categories, which means that the decision-making power 
is fragmented among the institutions, agencies, and the individual par¬ 
ticipants' social, cultural, economic, and political background. Such 
4 
premises affect or predetermine decision-making. It is thus assumed 
that in Macon County and Atlanta, Georgia, significant decisions or non- 
3 
This is because, in the initial year of revenue sharing, allot¬ 
ments were received after local governments had already enacted budgets 
for the 1972-73 fiscal year. Therefore, the budgetary influence of 
revenue sharing may be more instructively judged once, from the second 
year onwards, when revenue sharing funds had become resources on which 
the governmental units could regularly plan these funds with their own 
regular revenues. 
4 
Peter Backrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory 
and Practice (New York, 1970), p. 18. 
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decisions (limiting the scope of the actual decision-making to "safe" 
issues) probably emanate from more than one source. 
Important Concepts. The concept impact in this study, will refer 
to the reordering of priorities in the spending of Revenue Sharing funds 
from those of the national trend and pursuing those problems that are 
particularly salient in the black community. To facilitate discussion, 
it will be necessary to divide possible impact into two categories: 
(1) Reordering the priorities. . . and ... seeking novel 
solutions to outstanding problems, particularly those 
especially salient in black communities; and 
(2) Garnering for the black community a more equitable 
distribution of existing services and benefits provided 
by the government.5 
Other important concepts in this study are power and black power. For 
this study, power is defined as a position of ascendancy over others. In 
defining power, according to Baratz and Bachrach, there must be a con¬ 
flict over values (desired events, goals) or course of action between two 
groups or persons and that one group complies with another group's wishes 
because that group is fearful that the other group will deprive it of a 
value or values which it regards more highly than those which would have 
been achieved by noncompliance.^ In short, power is the ability of one 
group to extend or get another group to do something this group would not 
otherwise do. 
The last concept to be considered and relevant to this study is 
black power. In seeking political and economic power, black power recog- 
^Mack H. Jones, "Black Officeholders in Local Governments in the 
South: An Overview," Politics '71. Problems of Political Participation, 
p. 68. 
^Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty, p. 18. 
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nizes that new forms of decision-making must be implemented in the black 
community. That is, the establishment of new institutions that make par¬ 
ticipants, not recipients, out of a people traditionally excluded from 
the fundamental processes of this country.^ This is to say that the black 
masses in conjunction with their representatives must define their com¬ 
munity's goals and needs. Black public officials are important bases 
for black power. It is an avenue for channeling black needs and frus¬ 
trations into policy outcome. Specifically, black power in this study 
means that black officials in Macon County, Alabama and Atlanta, Georgia 
can use their positions to channel Revenue Sharing funds for the better¬ 
ment of the black masses. They can exercise control in this county and 
city to change from the nation-wide policy outcome in the spending of 
Revenue Sharing funds (which have been up to date, very oppressive toward 
the needs in the black community) to policy outcome more favorable to 
black needs. 
Review of Literature. In reviewing the literature on the spending 
of Revenue Sharing, the present writer has consulted numerous works— 
governmental documents, books, and articles—which focused on Revenue 
Sharing during the period under study. Attached is a partial working 
bibliography of some of the works consulted. 
Scope and Limitations. It seems advisable, in order that the 
reader may approach intelligently the data that will be presented in the 
study to indicate at the outset certain handicaps which were encountered 
^Charles V. Hamilton, "An Advocate of Black Power Defines It," in 
The Black Revolt and Democratic Politics, ed. Sondra Silverman (Boston: 
D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 61. 
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in the study. The study is limited by the availability of data. Due to 
the novelty of this type of Revenue Sharing, there is a limited amount of 
data and statistics relating to the operation of the Act. Thus, the 
study will encounter the problem of reliability in information obtained 
from interviews and questionnaires. 
Sources and Method. Most of the materials were obtained from the 
following sources: the Atlanta University Library, the Atlanta Public 
Library, Georgia State University Library, the Atlanta Constitution, the 
Montgomery Advertiser, the Tuskeqee News, and various privately printed 
and conducted surveys together with certain other materials found valu¬ 
able. However, the principal tools are interviews and questionnaires. 
The method will be largely descriptive and analytical. 
Significance of the Study. The significance of the study is the 
insight it provides on the regulations governing the Revenue Sharing Act. 
It provides clues respecting the promise and practice of the Revenue 
Sharing experience and suggest some directions for future investigation. 
This study will also give, in an analytical and descriptive manner, the 
wide latitude local officials have over the Act. And most importantly, 
the study is significant in that it attempts to describe critically the 
efforts made by black officials in trying to better the conditions of 
its poorer citizens—persons being predominantly black. 
CHAPTER II 
ORIGIN AND DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE SHARING 
The task of this chapter is to briefly review the background of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations and analyze the important provisions 
of the Revenue Sharing Act—the law which finally emerged from the pro¬ 
cess of Senate-House conflict, debate, and compromise in 1972. 
Although revenue sharing in the form of general-purpose bloc grants 
is, for the most part, a recent innovation, federal financial aid to 
state and local governments has been a part of the American federal sys¬ 
tem since its beginning. The general concept of revenue sharing refers 
to the sharing or the giving of federal revenues to other parts (state and 
local governments) of the federal system. Sharing of Federal revenues 
with the states has occurred on a short-term, special-purpose basis at 
various times in America's history. As a major activity of government, 
however, such distribution has taken the form of complex individually- 
targeted programs earmarked for individual program purposes under varying 
degrees of federal supervision and control. 
In 1790 at the recommendation of Secretary of Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton, the Federal Government assumed Revolutionary War debts in¬ 
curred by the States. Accomplished over the period 1790-1794 under 
authority of the Funding Act, assumption involved the issuance of Federal 
9 
10 
securities in exchange for certificates of war debt presented by the 
States.^ 
Land transactions also provided a form of revenue-sharing with 
newly-formed States on the western frontier in which there were exten¬ 
sive Federal holdings of land. To compensate for the tax disadvantages 
experienced by the States in consequence of such public land holdings, 
the Federal Government shared revenues received from land sales in such 
States; this was generally considered the first of the grants-in-aid. 
Grants ranged from three to five percent of the net proceeds from land 
sales, and were earmarked for local use in building transportation facili- 
2 
ties or for education —an approach which was to characterize the later 
grants-in-aid concept under which funds were granted for specific rather 
than general governmental purposes. 
In 1802, Congress provided that five percent of the proceeds from 
the sale of public lands in the new state of Ohio should be applied to 
the construction of roads. This precedent was followed for other new 
states, often with the stipulation that a portion of these funds be 
devoted to education. In his second inaugural address in 1805, President 
Thomas Jefferson urged that federal revenue be utilized for 
... a just repartition . . . among the states . . . 
applied. . . to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, 
education, and other great objects within each state.3 
^Congressional Digest, "Growth of Federal State Fiscal Relations," 
(Washington, D. C., February 15-March 15» 1971)» p. 100. 
2Ibid. 
3 
Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Revenue Sharing and The Federal System," 
(St. Louis, Missouri: Washington University, June 25, 1973)» p. 3» 
11 
Under the terms of the Surplus Distribution Act of 1836, Congress 
endorsed a form of revenue sharing when it voted to distribute surplus 
federal funds to state governments. The disbursement of $28 million to 
the states during the Jackson Administration represented the only instance 
in the United States history—until the present revenue sharing act—when 
Federal funds have been granted to the States without conditions governing 
the use of the funds. According to Walter Heller, the distributions were 
4 
made without restrictions as to purpose. 
The first ongoing Federal revenue sharing program to reflect the 
categorical grant approach is generally considered to be the 1862 Morri11 
Act.^ Under this program, which was designed to assist the States in 
establishing and maintaining what became known as "land-grant colleges," 
the medium of the grant was land rather than money. The Act specified 
the objectives of the grant, placed conditions on use of revenue from 
the sale of granted lands, and required annual reports to the Federal 
Government. 
In 19H» Congress began to impose even more significant restrictions 
on their grants. The Weeks Act provided for advance federal approval of 
state plan as well as for federal supervision of performance.^ 
The depression years of the 1930's saw an expansion of categorical 
4 
Legislative Analysis, "General Revenue Sharing Proposals," No. 7. 
92nd Congress, (Washington, D. C.î American Enterprise Institute, June 
21, 1971), p. 7. 
^Congressional Digest, "Growth of Federal State Fiscal Relations," 
(Washington, D. C., February 15-March 15, 1971), p. 100. 
^Legislative Analysis, p. 7. 
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grants. Initially concentrated in the welfare and economic security 
areas, they later expanded into the realm of low-rent public housing, 
provision of health services, programs for needy school-age youth, and 
a variety of Federally-supported "jobs" programs for the unemployed.^ 
In the period following World War II, categorical grants were 
further extended, particularly in the fields of health care, education, 
and in the redevelopment of urban areas. 
The modern concept of "no strings attached" revenue sharing was 
first proposed in Congress in 19^9. It was presented during the 80th 
Congress. In that year, Representative Errett P. Scrivner introduced a 
proposal calling for collectors of internal revenue to remit to each 
State treasurer on a quarterly basis one percent of Federal individual 
and corporate income taxes collected in the States, with the proviso 
that such revenue sharing was to be used for purposes of education in 
any manner determined to be appropriate by the State government. The 
proposal was not enacted.^ 
Early in the 1950‘s, the revenue sharing concept was widely dis¬ 
cussed by scholars and by public officials at both national and parti¬ 
cularly state levels of government. There emerged about as many versions 
of revenue sharing as there were supporters; with scores of them being 
introduced in Congress. However, much of the credit for bringing the 
concept to public attention has been attributed to Professor Walter 
Heller. Professor Heller, who, while chairman of the President's Council 
\egisl ative Analysis, p. 128. 
g 
Congressional Digest, "The Controversy Over Revenue Sharing," 
(Washington, D. C., February 15-March 15» 1971), p. 101. 
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of Economic Advisers in the early 1960's, proposed a detailed revenue 
9 
sharing plan. The plan was developed in cooperation with Dr. Joseph 
A. Pechman—who headed a task force to develop more fully the specific 
outline of the proposal. The most important aspect in the Heller-Pechman 
Plan was that it offered federal revenue sharing as a supplement to, 
rather than a substitute for, existing grant programs. 
Meanwhile, federal revenue sharing bills introduced in Congress 
accelerated in 1968—a banner year—to ninety different legislative pro¬ 
posals. Both major political parties in 1968 contained in their plat¬ 
forms specific federal revenue sharing proposals. It was not until the 
first year of the Nixon Administration, however, that revenue sharing 
received the impetus of Presidential backing. While outlining his first 
legislative program in April of 1969, former President Nixon called for 
... a start on sharing the revenues of the Federal 
Government, so that other levels of government . . . 
will not be caught in a constant fiscal crisis.^ 
The next important step in bringing to reality federal revenue 
sharing occurred in July of 1969, when Mr. Nixon called to the White House 
his revenue sharing supporters—mayors, governors, and country officials 
—to assist the Administration in developing a specific approach to 
revenue sharing. The 1969 proposed revenue sharing would have made five 
hundred million dollars ($500 million) in federal revenues available to 
state and local governments in fiscal 1971» with the total rising to five 
billion dollars ($5 billion) by fiscal 1976. After reaching an agreement 
9 
Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Revenue Sharing and the Federal System," 
p. 3. 
10 
Ibid., p. k 
14 
on some of the basic principles of federal revenue sharing, the bill was 
introduced to Congress in September of 1969* The President's revenue 
sharing bill promptly encountered a series of political obstacles. His 
proposal was completely stalled in the House of Representatives when the 
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, (D. Ark.) refused 
to hold hearings on the proposal in 1969 and 1970.^ Mills opposed reve¬ 
nue sharing simply because it meant a separation of revenue-raising 
responsibility from the authority over resource allocation. Other Con¬ 
gressmen opposed revenue sharing because they felt it fiscally unwise for 
the federal government to share some of its revenue when it was accumu¬ 
lating increasing deficits. Consequently, Congress did not act on Nixon's 
first revenue sharing proposal which means the obstacles to the bill 
proved to be successful in that they kept the bill from surfacing. 
As President Nixon continued to seek fiscal reform and realignment 
through revenue sharing in 1971 > the proposal still faced formidable 
opposition and attracted equally impressive support. Much of the oppo¬ 
sition was inspired by the implicit threat which revenue sharing posed 
to the existing traditional structure of federal aid. The opponents to 
Mr. Nixon's Revenue Sharing was broad-based. It had three chief ele¬ 
ments: Congressmen, administrators, and special interest groups. 
Members of Congress worked openly to defeat the Nixon Administration 
revenue sharing proposal. Opposition to the revenue sharing was centered 
12 
in the Congressional Committees, which jealously guarded the categorical 
William M. Kimmelman, Revenue Sharing and Local Government: The 
Case of the Birmingham Planning District (Alabama: University of Alabama 
Bureau of Public Administration, 1974), p. 13* 
12 
The key Congressional opponents to Revenue Sharing other than 
15 
programs they authorized. Some Congressmen regarded the thrust of reve¬ 
nue sharing programs as a threat to its own power to establish national 
priorities and to oversee the management of federal programs. The shift 
from Congress to the White House was threatening, indeed, as was the 
shift from federal bureaucracies to the governors and mayors. The de¬ 
pendence of categorical assistance on Congressional appropriations had 
enabled members of Congress, by the manipulation of grants and by their 
influence with administrators, to build up strong constituency relation¬ 
ships vested in the traditional system. 
Along with some Congressmen, administrators too felt threatened 
with the loss of power and authority, and most important their jobs. 
Certain groups—the elderly, the poor, and blacks—felt that their voices 
would be ignored in some state capitals and city halls. 
President Nixon, however, was not without assurances of powerful 
support for his new revenue sharing proposal. This support came from a 
broad spectrum of American politics including groups such as the National 
Conference of Governors, the National Conference of Mayors, the National 
Association of Counties, and the National Conference of State Legislative 
Leaders. 
Indeed, pressures by state and local government officials played a 
key role in winning Congressional approval of a five-year plan to share 
$30,236,400,000 in federal revenues with state and local governments. By 
Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee were John W. 
Byrnes (R. Wisconsin) who opposed uncontrolled state or local use of 
funds raised through federal taxation; and, Chairman Russell B. Long 
(D. La.) of the Senate Finance Committee opposed the plan on grounds 
that there were no surplus revenues to share. 
16 
state and local government officials and their national organizations 
lobbying to spur Congress to act on revenue sharing, this helped to 
convert Wilbur Mills—who had first opposed the plan—to supporting the 
bill. 
Nixon’s revenue sharing initiatives were further strengthened when 
his proposed legislation included a provision for direct allocation of 
funds to municipal governments. To certain doubters of his program, he 
gave assurances that revenue sharing money was to be new federal money. 
Because of the pressure exerted and these added provisions, Congressman 
Mills not only agreed to hold hearings on Nixon’s new proposal, but 
favored a revenue-sharing plan himself that would give benefits to urban 
areas. As a result, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act (Revenue 
Sharing) came into being on October 20, 1972, when it was signed into 
law by the President. 
The basic purpose of the revenue sharing bill that finally emerged 
is to return federal funds directly to state and local governments with 
very few strings attached. The no "strings attached" approach to revenue 
sharing has the effect of somewhat negating the impact of federal guide¬ 
lines and controls designed to insure black and poor people a favorable 
share of federal monies, equal employment opportunities, equal access to 
federally funded housing programs, and so on. What this means then is 
that the state and local governments that historically discriminated 
against poor and black people have absolute control in establishing guide¬ 
lines applicable to revenue sharing funds. And if history can be used as 
a measuring stick, there is ample evidence to support the view that, in 
the absence of strict federal guidelines, the state governments will not 
17 
be energetic in pursuing programs that benefit poor and black people. 
The decentralized system of distributing revenue sharing funds are 
given in the form of "bloc grants" that do not stipulate specific use. 
But instead, funds are for more of a general use for administering state, 
county, and municipal governmental services. Essential to this program 
is the curtailment of the "categorical grants" system—a system in which 
the federal government designated funds for specific programs and required 
community input. 
Revenue Sharing (general) provides for a total of $30.2 billion to 
be distributed automatically, in five yearly installments, to state and 
1 3 
local governments until fiscal year 1977. Since Congress did not pass 
revenue sharing legislation until October 1972, the $5-2 billion payment 
was made retroactively to January 1972. The remaining funds will be dis¬ 
tributed in the following manner: $5,975 billion in 1973; $6,125 billion 
in 197^+5 $6,275 billion in 1975; and $6,425 in 1976.^ With the exception 
1 3 
Research Atlanta, "Revenue Sharing in Atlanta and Fulton County," 
(July, 1973)» p. ii; The revenue sharing bill contained two parts: Gen¬ 
eral and Special Revenue Sharing. This study will not be dealing with 
"special revenue sharing," which is a separate effort to consolidate 
grants-in-aid. Special revenue sharing proposals cover fiscal year 1975 
through fiscal year 1979. The proposals would allocate $11 billion for 
operating costs to state and local governments. Special revenue sharing 
would also consolidate approximately 130 existing "categorical grants" 
into six broad categories (education, law enforcement and criminal justice, 
manpower, urban community development, health, and transportation). The 
proposals will have even fewer federal regulations than general revenue 
sharing. Congress has received separate bills for five of these cate¬ 
gories as special revenue sharing proposals. Of the six categories, 
manpower and urban community development have been implemented. 
14 
Ibid., p. 9 
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of 1972, distributions have been made on a quarterly basis—January, 
April, July, and October. Payments to state and local governments are 
made by the United States Department of the Treasury out of the State and 
Local Fiscal Assistance Trust Fund, which is established from federal 
income tax collections. Thus, the automatic pay-out provision for five 
years represents a significant change from categorical aid programs which 
were usually subjected to annual budgetary decisions by Congress. 
The allocation of funds to more than 38*000 state and local govern¬ 
ments is determined on the basis of formulas set forth in the Act as 
passed by the Congress. Congress provided two different formulas in 
determining the allocations for state areas (which include in each case 
both the state and its localities). The choice of formula is left to each 
state. The first formula, known as the five-factor formula and developed 
by the House of Representatives, gives these criteria: (1) population, 
(2) urbanized population, (3) per-capita income inversely weighted, (4) 
state income taxes, and (5) general tax effort]'* 
The second formula, known as the three-factor formula and developed 
by the Senate, gave recognition to these three criteria: (1) population, 
(2) general tax effort, and (3) per-capita income.^ The Senate formula 
differs from that of the House in that it does not place special emphasis 
on the use of state income taxes as distinct from other taxes. In addi¬ 
tion, the Senate formula uses general tax effort—that is, taxes collected 
by state and local governments—as a method of increasing revenue sharing 





differences between the three-factor and five-factor formulas is that the 
Senate (three-factor) formula favors relatively less populated, rural 
states, and the House (five-factor) formula favors the more populated, 
urban states. (See Table 1) 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF HIGHER URBANIZED AND LESSER URBANIZED STATES: 
PERCENTAGES OF URBANIZATION AND AMOUNTS OF RE¬ 
VENUE SHARING FUNDS ALLOCATED UNDER 
THE 5-FACTOR AND 3-FACTOR 
FORMULAS—1972 
Distribution (In Mi 11 ions) 
State 
Percent 
Urbanization 3-Factor 5-Factor 
1. Mass. 84.6 $144.7 $180.3 
2. N. J. 88.9 146.4 181.9 
3. N. Y. 85.6 501.2 643.0 
1. Ala. 58.4 98.9 73.1 
2. Ark. 50.0 60.0 38.4 
3- Miss. 44.5 96.6 45.7 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1972, p. 18: Joint 
General Explanation of the State 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 
(Washington, D. C.î U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 26. 
The actual amounts allocated were less than the sums shown above, which 
are unadjusted amounts. 
One can see that in each formula, on&-third of the allocation goes to 
the state government. The remaining two-thirds are divided by county 
according to the basic factor formula. The county*s share is then divided 
into three parts: the county government, the municipal governments as a 
group and townships as a group in proportion to the taxes each collects. 
20 
Finally, the municipalities and the townships sub-divide the money 
allocated to them as a group. The share of each is determined by the basic 
formulas population times tax effort, times inverse relative per-capita 
income. The basic formula for sub-dividing shares to the county is the 
product of each county^ population times its tax effort times the in¬ 
verse of its relative income. (See Table 2, page 21). In the applica¬ 
tion of this formula, population is based on the 1970 census.^ 
Alabama, because it is not a heavily urbanized state (the great 
majority of its counties being rural), uses the Senate formula which 
maximizes its total general revenue sharing allotment. The state, as a 
geographic area, received $87.8 million in 1972, with $29.3 million being 
distributed to the state government, while two-thirds, or $58.5 million, 
was reserved for the state1s sixty-seven counties and three-hundred and 
. . . . .... 18 
mnety-six municipalities. 
The state of Alabama revenue sharing was computed as follows: 
(a) Alabama*s share 
Weighted^ 
General Per-Capita 
Popul at ion Tax Effort Income 
$5.3 bil- x (Ala.) (3,444,165) (Ala.) (GTEF) ($3,139) (U.S.) 
lion (U.S.) '(203,810,000)^11 States-GTEF) ($2,332) (Ala.) 
After one-third of Alabama^ share, or $29.3 million, was allocated 
to the state government, the remaining two-thirds, or $58.5 million, was 
^Joint Center for Political Studies, "The Minority Community and 
Revenue Sharing," (Washington, D. C., June 1973)» p. 3. 
18 
Kimmelman, Revenue Sharing and Local Government, p. 18. 
19 
Weighted per-capita income is the inverting of the per-capita 
income of the United States with that of Alabama. General Tax Effort 
is calculated by dividing all net taxes collected by personal income. 
Table 2-FOUR STAGE INTRASTATE FORMULA 
20 
redistributed to the state government, 
c) If any local government's allocation is less than $200, the funds are reallocated to the 
county government, or in the case of a county government, funds are reallocated to the state. 
20 
Source: National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors,^Revenue Sharing Analysis and Report 
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distributed among all local units of government, including counties and 
municipalities. Since Alabama does not have township governments, the next 
phase in the distribution process was to compute the county area's share. 
The amount was then subdivided among the county and municipal governments 
within the county area. 
Using Macon County as a distribution model, the shares of all county 
areas in the State of Alabama were calculated as follows: 







(Macon Co.) (24,841) (GTEF) ($2,332) 
All Counties (3,444,825) (GTEF) ($2,821) 
After the Macon County area's share was calculated, the allocation to the 
Macon County government was made: 
(c) Macon County Government's Share 
Macon County 
. , ». X Net taxes collected by the county government  
rea s are Net taxes collected by all local units. 
After distributing the county government's share, the remaining amount of 
Macon County area's share was distributed to the municipal government 
which was calculated in the following manner: 












(Macon County) (GTEF) ($2,209) 
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Despite the absence of tight federal requirements for general 
revenue sharing fund use, there are several broad limitations. General 
revenue sharing funds received directly by local governments must be used 
within one of the following areas: 
1. Ordinary and necessary maintenance and 
operating expenses for: 
a. Public Safety (including law enforcement). 
b. Environmental Protection (including sewage 
disposal, sanitation, and pollution). 
c. Public transportation (including transit 




g. Social Services for the poor and aged. 
h. Financial Administration. 
2. Ordinary and necessary capital expenditures 
authorized by law.21 
Those funds which go directly to the states (the remaining one- 
third of each stated allocation) are not restricted to the eight cate¬ 
gories listed above but can be used in any manner the states choose. There 
is a limitation, however, which applies only to state governments. "A 
state government is required to maintain the same level of aid to local 
22 
governments as they did during fiscal year 1972." Under this "main¬ 
tenance of effort" provision, if a state reduces its aid to localities 
below that level, the Treasury Department automatically reduces the state*s 
share of revenue sharing funds by the same amount. 
Both revenue sharing funds going directly to localities and those 
21 
Department of the Treasury Office of Revenue Sharing, "What 
General Revenue Sharing Is All About," p. 4. 
22 
Joint Center For Political Studies, "The Minority Community 
and Revenue Sharing," p. 7. 
24 
going to the states may not be used, directly or indirectly, to meet the 
matching requirements of federal grant-in-aid programs. However, revenue 
sharing funds can be used to supplement other federal funds. 
Each state and locality which expects to receive the funds must 
submit a report to the Secretary of the Treasury which spells out the 
amounts and purposes for which the funds will be used. The plan must be 
submitted for each entitlement period. Both the reports showing planned 
use of revenue sharing funds must be published in a newspaper of general 
circulation within the governmental jurisdiction. 
Revenue sharing legislation, as in almost all cases involving 
federal expenditures, includes a provision which stipulates that, 
... no person should be excluded from participation, 
be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimina¬ 
tion on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex.23 
If cases of discrimination do arise, and the governor of the state is 
unwilling or unable to take remedial action, the Secretary of the Treasury 
may refer the matter to the U. S. Attorney General, who, under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, may bring civil action to correct the situation. 
Conclusively speaking, one notes that the different versions of 
legislations passed by Congress has reflected, to an extent, the philo¬ 
sophical orientation—liberal, or restrictive—of the incumbent President. 
That is, each President shapes his administration's approach to social and 
24 
economic programs by his personal political style and philosophy. Presi¬ 
dent Nixon's was no exception. His personal brand was called the New 
23 
Kimmelman, Revenue Sharing and Local Government, p. 27. 
24 
For example, the administration of John F. Kennedy was charac¬ 
terized as the New Frontier and Lyndon B. Johnson's as the Great Society. 
25 
Federalism. Revenue Sharing is the crux of this domestic doctrine. It 
is Nixons belief that the state and local governments can more effectively 
establish priorities of local citizens than the Federal government. His 
philosophy holds generally that government closest to the people is best, 
that the federal government is too far removed from local problems to 
address them adequately. To him, the federal government had grown too 
large and too complicated to be manageable. It was also the Nixon ad¬ 
ministration’s thesis not only that many Great Society programs were mis¬ 
guided, but that the sheer number and administrative complexity of the 
federal grant-in-aid programs rendered the federal government incapable 
of helping localities address their problems in any comprehensive fashion. 
Accordingly, then, Nixon’s revenue sharing plan called for a shifting of 
money and responsibility from the federal government (i.e., the national, 
regional, and local federal bureaucracies) to the various branches of 
state and local governments. The federal policy of making categorical 
grants to states, counties, and cities for specific programs—with tight 
guidelines attached—has thus been discontinued and replaced with a form 
of revenue sharing in which the state and local governmental agencies 
receive federal monies with "no strings attached." 
CHAPTER III 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MACON COUNTY, ALABAMA 
AND ATLANTA, GEORGIA 
This chapter is designed to describe the characteristics of Macon 
County and its locally elected officials (i.e., the County Commission, 
Tuskegee's Mayor and City Council) as well as the City of Atlanta and its 
elected officials (the Mayor and the City Council) by answering the fol¬ 
lowing questions: What are the areas* characteristics (i.e., their 
social, economical, and educational conditions)? Who are the local office¬ 
holders? What kinds of constituencies do they come from? And, most 
important, what are the officeholders* duties and what is the nature of 
their participation in, and impact upon, the decision making process in 
regard to Revenue Sharing while serving on their respective governing 
bodies? 
Macon County is situated in the central-eastern portion of the 
State of Alabama. It is bounded by Elmore, Tallapoosa, Lee, Russell, 
Bullock, and Montgomery counties. The total land area for the county is 
616 square miles. The population for Macon is 24,841. The population 
density of the area, then, is 40 people per square mile. According to the 
most recent census, over 44.4 percent of the county*s population is urban.^ 
V S. Department of Commerce, United States Census. 1970, p. 30; 
that means, 55.6 percent of the County's population is rural. 
26 
27 
The urban population of the county is lower than that of the State of 
Alabama, as the State has a 63.7 percent urban population and 36.3 percent 
rural population. It is significant to note that over 81 percent of the 
2 
population in Macon is black, while 19 percent is white. The county has 
a much higher percentage of black population than does the State of 
Alabama (as the latest available estimate for Alabama shows the black 
population to be slightly less than 30 percent). This means, in relation 
to the State of Alabama, that the County of Macon has a larger percentage 
of its populace living in the rural areas as well as a much larger per¬ 
centage of its population made up of blacks than does the State of Alabama. 
To make a serious assessment of the people's (who are overwhelmingly 
black) plight in Macon County, it is necessary, at this time, to give an 
analysis of the county's characteristics. That is, it is necessary to 
give a description of the county's social, educational, and economical 
conditions. Compared with the State of Alabama's median educational 
level which is 10.8, the educational level is low for Macon County. The 
median years of schooling for the county is 9*9 years, but only 8.9 years 
3 
for blacks. Although 39 percent of the county's population has gradu¬ 
ated from high school and a percentage of 14.7 has attended college for 
four years or more, 17.3 percent of the adult population of the county 
4 
has less than five years of schooling. 
The median family income for the County of Macon is $5,058 as com- 
2 
Southern Regional Council, Health Care in the South (Atlanta: 
Southern Regional Council, 1974), p. 14. 
3 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Characteristics of the Population: 
Part 2, Alabama, Vol. 1 (Bureau of Census, 1970), pp. 2-383 & 2-163- 
4 
U.S. Departement of Commerce, United States Census, (1970), p. 31. 
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pared to $7,266 for the State of Alabama. However, the median family 
income for blacks in the County is only $4,393 compared to $6,924 for 
whites in the County. An alarming fact about the County is that 37*4 per¬ 
cent of all families live with an income that is less than the national 
poverty level.^ For black families in the County, 42.9 percent live below 
the national poverty level.^ Still more alarming is the fact that 46.5 
percent of all persons in the County live below the poverty level.^ Quite 
devastating also is the percentage of blacks receiving public assistance 
(income) in the county which is 33.8 percent. And finally, 11.1 percent 
Q 
of the County's black families receive income from social security. 
Thus, low educational levels can be connected to low family income 
levels and to the failure of the County to develop at a higher rate. When 
educational levels and low income are tied together, it is easy to see 
how a county falls farther and farther behind and has less to offer its 
young people as each year passes. Low educational levels, and conse¬ 
quently low income levels, in the county stem from an economical pattern. 
The County traditionally has been an agricultural area where farming pro¬ 
vided most of the jobs and supported the economy of the County. A share- 
cropping system with cotton as the major crop demanded an abundance of 
low-skill labor. The family unit provided much of the labor required 
5Ibid., p. 33. 
^Characteristics of the Population: Part 2 Alabama, p. 2-401j but 
the percentage of families receiving public assistance income for the 
entire state of Alabama is only 8.1 percent; statewide for whites, 5.0 
percent; statewide for blacks, 19.6 percent. 
^Southern Regional Council, Health Care in the South, p. 14. 
g 
Characteristics of the Population: Part 2 Alabama, p. 2-401. 
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for the farms. As many hours of labor were required for farming, the 
family head did not emphasize the advantage of getting an education. 
Consequently, with the decline of cotton, large numbers of uneducated 
people became unemployed; and with the mechanization of farms, unemploy¬ 
ment became prevalent. 
Indeed, the low income levels have contributed to many of the ills 
that affect blacks in the County. For example, out of 6,457 households 
in the County, 35.5 percent of the units lack some or all plumbing facili- 
9 
ties. But for blacks, the percentage is higher with 42.5 percent lacking 
some or all plumbing facilities.^ The consequence of having such low 
income level is that it will not support adequately health, school facili¬ 
ties, or, for that matter, any other type of (social) services that are 
desperately needed throughout the County. Although incomes are rising, 
they still are inadequate to provide the necessities (especially social 
services) of life in a period of inflation. 
Local officials who are responsible for alleviating the ills that 
affect the people in this County and in the City of Tuskegee are collect¬ 
ively known as the County Commission, the City Council and the Mayor of 
Tuskegee. For the most part, decisions on public policy rest with those 
who occupy the stated positions of formal authority in the two govern¬ 
mental units. That is, the vast bulk of local government business is 
carried on by these elected officials. Although individuals or organiza¬ 
tions seek to influence or control governmental action in the community, 
9 
Southern Regional Council, p. 14. 
10U. S. Department of Commerce, County and City Data Book: Statis¬ 
tical Abstract Supplement (Bureau of the Census, 1972), p. 35.1 
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they are badly handicapped in their efforts unless they have access to 
the appropriate legal authorities. 
Before going into further detail, it may be instructive to discuss 
briefly the functions of the County Commission, the City Council, and the 
Mayor. The County Commission features a small governing board whose 
members serve collectively as the legislature. The body consists of four 
members who are elected by districts; and, a chairperson who is appointed 
by the commission members. The chairperson does not have a vote on the 
Commission unless there is a tie between the elected members. The com¬ 
missioners serve for a period of four years with staggered terms.^ 
The powers of the Commission are great. The County Commission 
controls the financial structure of the County; it approves all County 
appropriations; authorizes all purchases for the County; designates all 
roads and bridges to be constructed or repaired; and, in general provides 
for the general welfare of the people in the County (which includes im- 
12 
proving sanitary conditions, providing care for indigent persons, etc.). 
The City of Tuskegee, in the County of Macon, is the major urban 
center as well as the County Seat. Although blacks constitute 81 percent 
of the Countyls population, they constitute an even greater percentage 
of Tuskegee's population. Of 11,028 persons in Tuskegee, 88.2 or 9,726 
1 3 of them are black. This city^ government consists of an elected mayor 
^Alabama Constitution (1939), Act Number 334, Sections One and 
Two, pp. 226-227. 
12 
Alabama Constitution (1939), Act Number 334, Sections Three- 
Fourteen, pp. 226-228. 
1 3 U.S. Department of Commerce, Characteristics of the Population: 
Part 2 Alabama, Vol. 1 (Bureau of the Census, 1972), p. 2-44. 
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and five elected councilmen. The mayor and councilmen serve for a period 
of four years. The government of Tuskegee, thus, combines an elected 
mayor with an elected city council which tie them both to the voters. 
But, within the government, there is fractionalization of power, with 
the mayor being both limited (in his powers) and compelled to share re¬ 
sponsibilities with another decision-making agency—the council. 
The council is legally responsible for making all ordinances pur¬ 
suant to state law and the city charter. In the broadest sense, the city 
council "makes policy" for the city; that is, it chooses among alternative 
courses for taxing people, spending money, and the like. The policy 
initiative is more likely to come, according to one councilman interviewed, 
from Mayor Ford rather than from the council. But the council still has 
the legal power either to approve, to disapprove, or to change any allo- 
14 
cation of city funds. 
This arrangement (mayor-council) in Tuskegee is further characterized 
by the mayor who has significant personnel, financial, general adminis¬ 
trative powers and the authority to veto legislative actions by the coun¬ 
cil. Thus, under this system the mayor wields considerable influence 
over the kinds of policy decisions made. The mayor of Tuskegee is also 
a full-time employee, while all of the councilmen must divide their time 
between their private occupations and public service. What is more, 
staff assistance is minimal or non-existent for the council. 
The distribution of the black population is a significant source of 
power across Macon County, and as a result, black citizens not only serve 
14 
Alabama Constitution. (1898), Number 106, Section 11, pp. 209- 
212. 
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on the governing boards, but are in majority on the County Commission (three 
out of four) as well as a black mayor and predominantly black City Council 
(four out of five) in the major urban center of the County.^ Given the 
large proportion of the black population, there is a potential base of 
black power. Thus, the most significant source of black political power 
rests with the elected officeholders on the various governing boards—the 
County Commission, the Mayor and City Council of Tuskegee. 
But, just having black faces on different boards does not automati¬ 
cally mean that they are indeed participating and making policy decisions. 
Data reveal that with few exceptions black officeholders in Macon County 
are given the same respect and deference as previous officials. That is, 
according to the information given, they participate and deliberate freely 
on their respective governing bodies. In fact, research indicates that 
there are extensive deliberation and debate within their governments in 
setting program priorities with revenue sharing money. 
It might be useful now to turn our attention to the personal charac¬ 
teristics of the officeholders. This inquiry covers the elected officials 
at the county and municipal (Tuskegee) levels in Macon County. Question¬ 
naires to those officials holding office in the Fall of 197*+ were adminis¬ 
tered personally. As Table 3» page 33, indicates a total of eight ques- 
^It should be noted that the chairperson of the County Commission 
—who is not elected by the citizens but by the commissioners themselves 
—is a white woman. So, the commission has three black elected members, 
one white elected member, and a white chairperson. However, the chair¬ 
person only, for the most part, presides over commission meetings and 
votes only in case of a tie between the elected members. 
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tionnaires out of a possible ten, were administered. 
TABLE 316 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES ADMINISTERED TO PERSONS HOLDING OFFICE 






Mayor 1 1 100.0 
City Council 5 4 80.0 
County Commission 4 3 75.0 
Total 10 8 80.0 
It is difficult to describe a "typical" officeholder in Macon 
County. For the officeholders in the County come from varying income, 
educational, and occupational backgrounds. Yet, we can gain perspective 
on them by positing some characteristics of a "typical" officeholder 
in the area. The most outstanding feature of the officeholders is the 
relatively high level of education acquired by the officials, especially 
the city councilmen of Tuskegee. As Table 4 shows, one-hundred percent 
of the councilmen and sixty-six percent of the County Commission have had 
at least some college training, and thirty-three percent of the County 
Commissioners and twenty-five percent of the City Councilmen have earned 
Data for this table were obtained from questionnaires. All black 
members of both the City Council (4) and County Commission (3) were 
interviewed as well as the Mayor of Tuskegee who is also black. There¬ 
fore, only the white City Councilman and the white County Commissioner 
were not interviewed, primarily because they were unavailable. 
TABLE 4 
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDING OFFICEHOLDERS IN MACON 
COUNTY, ALABAMA SEPTEMBER, 1974 (PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION) 
City County 












Some College 25.0 
33.0 







35 and under 
36 to 49 
25.0 X 












^Data compiled from all 
holders in September, 1974. 
questionnaires received from office- 
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at least one advanced or professional degree. 
Typically, and in addition to being well trained, the officerholders 
are all male, middle-aged, and well-to-do (i.e., they come from the 
middle and upper strata of their communities). Table 4 shows that seventy- 
five percent of the City Councilmen are businessmen and twenty-five per¬ 
cent are professionals. The County Commissioners are almost the same as 
19 
the councilmen, with thirty-three percent being professionals. 
From this, it appears that the lower and working classes are not 
represented among the officeholders, giving rise to a situation in which 
the masses of black people do not have a direct participant and/or formal 
spokesman in the policy input process (the City Council and the County 
Commission decisions). Consequently, the lower and working classes 
chances of deriving benefits commensurate with their needs are therefore 
minimized. 
Atlanta, Georgia 
The City of Atlanta serves as both the capital of the State of 
Georgia and County Seat of Fulton County. In addition, many southeastern 
regional headquarters for both federal and private operations have located 
in this northwest Georgia city. Atlanta was incorporated in 1847. The 
City occupies 136.0 square miles of area in portions of both Fulton and 
DeKalb Counties. Atlanta's estimated population in 1972 was 496,973• 
Of this, 52 percent or 256,470 is black while 48 percent or 240,503 is 
Data obtained from questionnaires. 
19 
Data obtained from questionnaires. Specifically, the city council- 
men's occupations are as follows: one supermarket owner; a funeral service 
owner; a Cadillac dealer; and a retired teacher from Tuskegee Institute. 
Of the county commissioners, their occupations are as follows: one general 
36 
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white» Thus, Atlanta's population has a much higher percentage of 
blacks than does the county of Fulton (as the latest available estimate 
for Fulton shows the black population to be slightly less than 40 per¬ 
cent). 
The median income for Atlanta citizens is high. The median income 
for the City of Atlanta is $8,399 as compared to $8,167 for the State of 
Georgia. But this median income figure in Atlanta can be misleading. 
That is, the concentration of great wealth in the hands of a few can 
inflate the average for the whole city—as is the case in Atlanta. 
Despite Atlanta's high median income, the city had 81,700 persons (or 
16.5 percent of the total population) earning less than the official 
poverty level in 1969. Another alarming fact about this city is that 
15.9 percent of all families live with an income that is less than the 
national poverty level; but for black families, the percentage is worse 
at 25.1 percent. The percentage of all families receiving public- 
assistance income in Atlanta is 9.0 percent, while 9.5 percent of all 
families receives Social Security. It should be noted that for blacks, 
21 
the percentage is at 14.7 and 7.0, respectively. What these social and 
economic figures show is that even in a highly industrialized city like 
Atlanta, there is a considerable amount of poverty. These figures further, 
food store owner; a retired public school principal; anda retired college 
instructor who also owns a small variety store. 
20 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Characteristics of the Population: 
Part 12 Georgia, Vol. 1 (Bureau of the Census, 1970), p. 12-70. 
21 
Ibid., pp. 12-332 and 12-337 
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In part, show or reflect the general population Atlanta has been attracting 
in the past decades—which is the low-income, unskilled, rural migrants. 
Local elected officeholders who are responsible for providing public 
services to the above constituents are the mayor and city counciImen of 
Atlanta. The City Council is the legislative branch of the city govern¬ 
ment, and as such, is vested with power to enact laws for Atlanta. The 
Council appropriates the funds for the city, adopts the annual budget, 
sets the tax rate, grants special licenses, authorizes contracts and 
franchises, and confirms appointments as heads of departments. The 
Council consists of a President, one member from each of the City’s twelve 
districts, and six members elected at-large. The Councilmen, then, are 
elected either by a majority vote of the qualified voters in a particular 
district of the city or by a majority vote of the whole city. All these 
officials serve for a term of four years. 
The City Council utilizes a committee system to aid in governing 
the citizens of Atlanta. That is, proposed ordinances are referred to 
one of the Council committees for the purpose of close study, or public 
hearings, (if necessary) and for reporting back to the whole City Council 
its findings and recommendations. When an ordinance is finally passed by 
the Council, it is certified to the Mayor for his approval or disapproval. 
The Mayor is the Chief Executive of Atlanta, and is responsible for 
assuring that the laws of the state and ordinances of the City are ob¬ 
served and enforced. In addition to having administrative responsibility 
for the City government, he has the right to approve or veto all action 
of the Council (subject to being overridden by two-thirds vote), the 
power to appoint or remove from office all directors of departments in 
38 
the city government, and the appointment of a number of citizen boards. 
As a member of the Budget Committee, the Mayor exercises significant 
influence in the overall financial operation of the City. Thus, the Mayor 
has the general functions and power that are common to many (municipal) 
chief executives. 
Generally, it is true, from the point of view of representation, 
that Atlanta's City Council and Mayor function to "represent the people." 
But the questions remain, exactly who are the officeholders that represent 
the people in Atlanta? In "representing the people," Do the City Council- 
men reflect the population composition of their constituencies? Or a 
certain segment within their constituencies? To answer these questions, 
let us now turn our attention to the personal characteristics of Atlanta's 
officeholders; mainly, the City Council. It should be noted that the 
following information was gathered through questionnaires. Some were 
administered personally, while others were mailed to the stated officials 
holding offices in the Fall of 197^ and Spring, 1975. All eighteen (18) 
counciImen, the council president, and the mayor were given an opportunity 
to respond to the questionnaires. However, everyone did not respond. As 
Table 5 indicates, a total of eleven questionnaires out of a possible twenty 
were actually used in this analysis. 
Atlanta's City Council members are generally better-educated, more 
prestigiously employed, and from the middle-class segment of the popula¬ 
tion (See Table 6). It is said that people need not be physically repre¬ 
sented on a City Council or any governing board in order for their interests 
to be realized. The various classes (i.e., lower working, etc.) are not 
represented on the city council, since most council members come from 
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the bourgeois-middle class. Yet our system of popular elections requires 
these council members to represent the interests of all their constitu¬ 
ents, even though they do not or may not share the same social background 
as their average constituent. 
22 
TABLE 5 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES ADMINISTERED TO PERSONS HOLDING OFFICE 






Mayor 1 1 100.0 
Council President 1 1 100.0 
City Councilmen 18 9 50.0 
Total 20 11 55.0 
However, evidence indicates that Atlanta's Council members generally 
mirror their constituents in certain "birthright" characteristics—race, 
religion, and ethnic background, etc. More than 75 percent of Atlanta's 
Council members (percentage of those responding) have been exposed to a 
college education, which is a contrast to the educational level of the 
23 
total population. For the educational and occupational levels of the 
Council members are higher than the general population. Atlanta's City 
Council members are concentrated in prestigious occupations. That is, 
Data for this table were obtained from questionnaires. 
23 
Although 46.5 percent of Atlanta's adult population have gradu¬ 
ated from high school, only 34.0 percent of the black population of the 
city have a high school education. 
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TABLE 6 
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDING OFFICEHOLDERS IN ATLANTA, 
GEORGIA—FALL, 1974 (PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION) 
Ci ty Council 
Characteristics Council President Mayor 
Race 
Black 67.0 X 




100.0 X X 
Education 
Elementary 
High School 33.0 









35 and Under 33.0 X 
36 to 49 33.0 X 










Note: This compilation was based on responding officeholders and 
not on the entire make-up of the City Council. 
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a great majority of these Council members are either engaged in profes¬ 
sional occupations, proprietors or officials of business concerns. These 
occupations are those involving extensive public contact. Lawyers are the 
largest single occupational category. Occupational data also clearly 
indicate that the City Councilman^ job is part-time with a salary that 
is not self-supporting. A Council member in Atlanta receives $8,000 per 
year, while the Council President receives $10,000. Council members (for 
their own benefit) need to or must come from occupational groups with 
flexible work responsibility. Since serving on the Council is a part-time 
job, the lawyer or business owner can satisfy this criteria and can also 
adjust his work more readily so that of the Council's haphazard schedule. 
In short, the Councilman's occupations provide free time, public contact, 
and social respectability. 
Why should Atlanta's citizens elect officials with such a background? 
Perhaps Atlanta's voters do this because its the usual trend all over 
America. That is, constituents tend to accept higher educated, more 
"prestigiously" employed candidates in the name of success, status, and 
the popular conceptions of "qualifications" for these elected positions 
rather than the candidates with an average education, and less prestigious 
occupations. Consequently, in Atlanta, the voters seem to want candidates 
typical of themselves in race and ethnic background, but with an educa¬ 
tion, occupation, and social status above the average. In short, Atlanta 
seemed to prefer that their officials be "local boys who have made good." 
CHAPTER IV 
TUSKEGEE/MACON COUNTY USES OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS 
As discussed earlier, the Revenue Sharing Act is written so that local 
governments are required to expend funds in specified areas which in the 
Act, are called "priority expenditures."^ Not only must local governments 
spend these funds in defined areas, they must report to the Secretary of 
the Treasury on expected uses of the funds. In addition, after the funds 
have been received, local officials have to report on the actual uses of 
the funds. Behind these reports are policy decisions relating to spending 
priorities which any critical study of Revenue Sharing must inevitably 
deal with in an effort to answer the following questions of and about state 
and local governments. Have these governments, in spending their revenue 
sharing funds, respected the restrictions and guidelines which Congress 
intended to effectuate? More significantly, perhaps, have they responded 
to the needs and aspirations of the relatively poorer, unorganized, and 
inarticulate groups in their communities? In dispensing their resources 
have these governments overcome widespread citizen frustrations from felt 
"Priority expenditures" means (1) Ordinary and necessary maintenance 
and operating expenses for (a) public safety (including law enforcement, 
fire protection, and building code enforcement); (b) environmental pro¬ 
tection (including sewage disposal, sanitation, and pollution abatement); 
(c) public transportation (including transit systems and streets and 
roads); (d) health; (e) education; (f) financial administration; and (2) 
Ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law. 
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inabilities to influence the direction of public affairs? The last two 
interrelated problems may well be at the heart of the local fiscal crisis, 
and revenue sharing is perceived as an opportunity to deal successfully 
with them. The answers to these questions will be sought in Macon County's 
uses of revenue sharing funds. That is, it is the specific task of this 
chapter to evaluate the impact of revenue sharing funds on local spending 
decisions—especially with regards to programs allocations—and to inves¬ 
tigate the nature of citizen participation in the planning and the dis¬ 
tribution of revenue sharing funds. The record of expenditures rather than 
the record of receipts will constitute the most critical ingredient of 
this inquiry into the revenue sharing act inaugurated by Congress in 1972. 
In that connection, it is appropriate to keep in mind that these spending 
decisions, in common with all others, will not have been made without 
the intrusion of legal and political restraints. That is, restraints— 
past experience, personal preferences, and articulated interests in the 
community—for the most part, will predispose public officials to a given 
pattern of priorities in their approaches to expenditure budgeting decisions. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the local expenditure 
of revenue sharing funds was the resulting gap between operating and capi¬ 
tal expenditures for Macon County's two governments combined (see Tables 
7-9).2 
Capital expenditures of all surveyed local governments in Macon 
3 
County accounted for almost 53-7 percent of the revenue sharing decisions. 
2 
For Table nine, see page 45. 
3 




REVENUE SHARING FUNDS RECEIVED BY MACON COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND TUSKEGEE*S 
FROM JANUARY, 1973-JUNE, 1974 AND DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTED REVENUE 





Total $1,138,646 Tuskegee & 
Macon County 100.0 
Operating 390,004 Il II 34.3 
Capital 612,030 Il II 53.7 
Balance 136,612 Il II 12.0 
TABLE 85 
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTED REVENUE SHARING FUNDS, CAPITAL AND OPERA¬ 




Total $679,229 Macon 100.0 
Operating 108,821 1 1 16.0 
Capital 495,403 1 1 72.9 
Balance 75,005 1 1 11.0 
Several reasons can be advanced to explain the wide difference between 
The Tuskeqee News, "Revenue Sharing Actual Use Reports for Macon 
County and Tuskegee Governments," 30 August 1973, pp. 2 & 11; 5 September 




DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTED REVENUE SHARING FUNDS, CAPITAL AND OPERA¬ 




Total $459,417 Tuskegee 100.0 
Operating 281,183 1 1 61.2 
Capital 116,627 II 25.4 
Balance 61,607 II 13.4 
operating and capital expenditures. One plausible explanation is that 
many Alabama local governments have found access to local borrowing very 
difficult. State law makes it difficult for localities to incur indebted¬ 
ness. State restrictions converge on local governments budgetary pro¬ 
cesses to encourage budget officials to "pay as they go." However, when 
revenue sharing funds became available, those additional funds became a 
windfall by which local officials were provided an opportunity to satisfy 
a backlog of capital wants. It is known also that many of the local 
officials have expressed personal reservations about the long-term certainty 
of revenue sharing funds beyond 1976. Then, for safety's sake, the funds, 
in their minds, should be spent in such a way as not to commit the local 
government to continuing expenses and thus additional taxes after revenue 
sharing's demise. Much of the revenue sharing funds were, therefore, com¬ 
mitted to "one-shot" projects. For example, the Macon County Commission 
^The Tuskeqee News. "Revenue Sharing Actual Use Reports for Macon 
County," 5 September 1974; p. 8; 30 August 1973» p. 11. 
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voted in August, 1973 to allocate approximately $220,000 each year for 
the next four years for the construction of a new county courthouse. The 
Commission has and will receive approximately $260,000 in revenue sharing 
funds each year for the next four years.^ The County Commission moved to 
allocate the remainder of the funds $40,000 each year, to the four districts 
for specific use in those areas. What the money in each of the four dis¬ 
tricts of the county will be used for, apparently is at the discretion of 
the commissioner from the district. Therefore, approximately $40,000 was 
dispensed among the districts1 commissioners to take care of all the other 
needs of the citizens in the county. 
Turning more specifically to the expenditure choices of revenue 
sharing, one should keep in mind that—even though there are specified 
"priority categories" governing the Act—state and localities have sub¬ 
stantial freedom and latitude in deciding how these funds should be spent. 
Indeed, localities have considerable latitude including discretion respec¬ 
ting how much of the revenue sharing funds will be spent on any of the 
national priorities. Thus, the question then becomes not how much revenue 
sharing funds there is for each locality, but what priorities the available 
funds were and will be spent for? 
In that connection, we will now discuss the specific use of revenue 
sharing funds in Macon County. An analysis of the Actual Use Reports from 
January, 1973-June, 1974 shows a total allocation of $1,138,646. Of this 
$136,612 or 12.0 percent was shown in the Actual Use Reports as a balance 
^Tuskeqee News. "Revenue Sharing Monies Channeled To Courthouse," 
30 August 1973» p. 1. 
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unspent. The expenditures categories, in order of descending importance 
were: $351,057 or 35.0 percent multipurpose and general government; 
$241,695 or 24.1 percent for financial administration; $183,524 or 18.3 
percent for public transportation; $81,234 or 8.1 percent for public 
safety; $42,079 or 4.2 percent for environmental protection; $40,000 or 
4.0 percent for education; $27,335 or 2.7 percent for environmental con¬ 
servation; $17,414 or 1.8 percent for recreation; $10,832 or 1.1 percent 
for health; $6,864 or 0.7 percent for recreation and cultural activi- 
g 
ties. In all, 53.7 or $612,030 of the funds were allocated for capital 
improvement; 34.3 percent or $390,004 of the funds were spent for opera- 
9 ting expenses. 
The data for the period covered on local revenue sharing spending 
decision suggest that the decisions are made in much the same manner as 
the decisions by which municipal or local governments have customarily 
been made. That is, data on such decisions about the localities studied, 
clearly indicate that programs which received high priority traditionally 
(i.e., with regular local tax money and not federal money with strings 
attached), received correspondingly high priority when local officials 
expended revenue sharing receipts. To be sure, just as capital improve¬ 
ment, public safety (police and fire), and public transportation (includ¬ 
ing streets, roads, highways, and bridges) received a high percentage of 
the regular budgets, so too are they the main beneficiaries of revenue 
sharing funds. 
g 
Tuskeqee News. "Revenue Sharing Actual Use Reports for Macon County 
and Tuskegee Governments," 5 & 19 September 1974, pp. 8 & 2; 30 August 
1973, pp. 2 & 11. 
^Ibid., see Tables 10-12, pages 48, 49, and 50. 
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TABLE 10 
ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS BY PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS 
IN DOLLARS AND PERCENTAGES, MACON COUNTY AND TUSKEGEE FROM 
JANUARY, 1973-JUNE, 1974 
Macon County and Tuskegee Actual Expenditures 
Priority Expenditures 
Categories Amount Expended Percent 
Total $1,002,034* 100.0 
1. Public Safety 81,234 8.1 
2. Environmental Protection 42,079 4.2 
3. Public Transportation 183,524 18.3 
4. Health 10,832 1.1 
5. Recreation 17,414 1.8 
6. Libraries - - 
7. Social Services (for aged & poor) - - 
8. Financial Administration 241,695 24.1 
9. Multipurpose and General 
Government 351,057 35.0 
10. Education 40,000 4.0 
11. Social Development - - 
12. Housing & Community Development - - 
13. Economic Development - - 
14. Environmental Conservation 27,335 2.7 
15. Recreation Culture 6,864 0.7 
*Note: The total amount received for this period was $1, 138,646, 
but of this amount only $1,002,034 was spent. Therefore, this left an 
unspent balance of $136,612. 
SOURCE: The Tuskegee News and Official Governmental Revenue Sharing 
Actual Use Reports of the U.S. Treasury Department. (For specific cita¬ 
tion, see footnote on page 39). 
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TABLE 11 
ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS BY PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS 
IN DOLLARS AND PERCENTAGES, MACON COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
JANUARY, 1973-JUNE, 1974 




Amount Expended Percent 
Total $604,224 100.0 
1. Public Safety 12,112 2.0 
2. Environmental Protection 17,301 2.9 
3. Public Transportation 163,078 27.0 
4. Health - - 
5. Recreation 2,012 .3 
6. Libraries - - 
7. Social Services - - 
8. Financial Administration 63,692 10.5 
9. Multipurpose & General Government 306,029 50.7 
10. Education 40,000 6.6 
11. Social Development - - 
12. Housing & Community Development - - 
13» Economic Development - - 
14. Environmental Conservation - - 
15» Recreation Culture - - 
SOURCE: The Tuskeqee News and Official Governmental Revenue Sharing 
Actual Use Reports to the United States Treasury Department. (For specific 
citation, see footnote on page 39)• 
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TABLE 12 
ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS BY PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS 
IN DOLLARS AND PERCENTAGES, TUSKEGEE, ALABAMA GOVERNMENT 
JANUARY, 1973-JUNE, 1974 
Tuskegee, Alabama Government Actual Expenditures 
Priority Expenditures 
Categories Amount Expended Percent 
Total $397,910 100.0 
1. Public Safety 69,122 17.4 
2. Environmental Protection 24,778 6.2 
3. Public Transportation 20,446 5.1 
4. Health 10,832 2.7 
5. Recreation 15,402 3.9 
6. Libraries - - 
7. Social Services - - 
8. Financial Administration 178,003 44.8 
9. Multipurpose and General Government 45,028 11.3 
10. Education - - 
11. Social Development - - 
12. Housing & Community Development - - 
13. Economic Development - - 
14. Environmental Conservation 27,335 6.9 
15. Recreation Culture 6,864 1.7 
SOURCE: The Tuskeqee News and Official Governmental Revenue 
Sharing Actual Use Reports to the United States Treasury Department. 
(For specific citation, see footnote on page 39). 
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However, to avoid any possible misleading impressions from the 
spending decisions of the major program areas, a descriptive or more de¬ 
tailed commentary is now appropriate. The category "multipurpose and 
general government" represents the greatest single class of investment of 
revenue sharing funds for both governments combined. Most of the expendi¬ 
tures under this heading (as already alluded to) stemmed from an agreement 
by the government (County Commission) to allocate approximately $220,000 
of its yearly revenue sharing receipts to help finance construction of 
a new courthouse.^ Since the scope of this study covers a span of a 
year and a half, the approximate amount allocated toward the building of 
the courthouse as of June, 1974 is $300,000. If one substracts $300,000 
from the total expended funds in Macon for "multipurpose and general 
government," the remaining $51>057 represents only a modest amount for 
the category's other expenditures. Since the Commission's plan includes 
for the courthouse to contain the sheriff's office, the circuit clerk's 
office, probate judge, special juvenile court (which is not unusual) etc., 
the $300,000 could or should be added to the "public safety"—which makes 
a total of $481,000—that category for expended revenue sharing funds 
by far would exceed all others. 
The category "financial administration" represents the second 
greatest ($241,695) allocation of revenue sharing funds in Macon County. 
Under this heading, most of the expenditure originated from (operational/ 
maintenance particularly in Tuskegee) salary increases to city personnel, 
as well as additional city personnel. According to the information obtained 
^Tuskegee News. "Revenue Sharing Monies Channeled to Courthouse," 
30 August 1973» p. 1. 
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from the questionnaires given to local officials in Macon County, salary 
increases (five percent) were given to all city personnel (clerks, sani¬ 
tation workers, etc.)» Also, revenue sharing funds under this category 
enabled the county government to employ additional employees.^ 
The second distinct pattern that has emerged from the expenditure 
choices of revenue sharing funds is the absence of any significant 
spending in the social services areas (see Table 13)» Of the $1,138,646 
used by all local units of government in Macon County for capital expendi- 
12 
tures, $50,000 were spent in social service fields, as follows: 
TABLE 1313 
SOCIAL SERVICES FIELDS EXPENDITURES 
Social Services Field 
Units of Local Government 
Macon County & Tuskeqee Percent 
Education $40,000 4.0 
Health 10,000 1.1 
Social Development/Services - - 
Housing/Community Development - - 
Total $50,000 5.1 
Data obtained from various questionnaires. 
12 
The Tuskeqee News. "Revenue Sharing Actual Use Reports," 
5 & 19 September 1974, pp. 2 & 8. 
1 3 The Tuskeqee News, ibid. In the field of education, the money 
expended was used to build a cafeteria for a predominantly black high 
school. The $10,832 expended for health could be added to the category 
of transportation since the money was used to purchase a vehicle. The 
vehicle is used by the county to transport senior citizens to and from 
the City of Tuskegee once a month. 
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It is significant to note that social service is near the bottom in pri¬ 
ority. Since Macon County’s spending distribution pattern has omitted 
significant attention to the special requirements of the poor, this 
raises serious questions about responsiveness on the part of local offi¬ 
cials toward the needs of a large segment of their population which (be¬ 
cause of extreme poverty), finds access to the decision-making processes 
exceedingly difficult. To be sure, this "priority category" (social 
services) warrants comment. 
Since there are no legal requirements that citizens or segments of 
the community be consulted on the state or local level, the question that 
is germane to this study is: how did these local officials set their pri¬ 
orities for use of revenue sharing funds, or what criteria (if any) did 
they use to decide the priorities? In September of 1974, questionnaires 
were administered to eight elected public officials in the geographical 
area within the scope of the study. A total of five officials answered 
this question. Two respondents stated that their governments’ priorities 
were "based upon the needs of the public." Another respondent revealed 
that they established priorities by deciding (among themselves) what was 
best. Still another stated that the government "greases the loudest wheel 
first." Meaning, of course, that they adhered to the most adamant con¬ 
stituents). And finally, the last official answered the question by 
14 
stating that he "acted upon the advice from his citizens." But it 
is significant to note that this official declined to say what the advice 
14 
Information obtained from questionnaires. 
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entailed. All local officials in Macon County and the City of Tuskegee 
governments further revealed, in their questionnaires, that the priority¬ 
setting process was publicized, and for the most part, through the local 
newspaper, the Tuskegee News. 
Of the eight officials interviewed, they were evenly divided on the 
question of "involvement by the community." Half (4) agreed that the "com¬ 
munity involvement" in priority-setting was "extensive"; while the other 
15 
half stated that there was "minor involvement." The most frequently 
utilized type of activity to influence revenue sharing (but not necessarily 
successfully done) was through city council and commission meetings, public 
hearings, and to a lesser degree, personal contact by the community with 
their locally elected officials. The only organizations or groups, how¬ 
ever, to present an alternative plan to either the county or city govern¬ 
ment were the Lions, Elks, and Civitan Clubs. Others interested and 
involved (but did not present an alternative plan to what the various 
administration proposed) were the Model City Commission, Community Action 
Program, and Neighborhood Coordinators.^ And finally, there were a few 
individual citizens who showed and expressed involvement in their govern¬ 
ment, but again, failed to present an alternative plan to what had already 
been proposed and published in the Tuskegee News by the public officials. 
Questions were asked to determine: (1) the degree of debate and 
deliberation within the local governments in setting priorities; and (2) 




expenditures. Five of the eight respondents indicated that there were 
extensive deliberation and debate within their governments when setting 
program priorities for revenue sharing funds. The other three respondents 
indicated that, within the government only minor deliberation and debate 
had taken place. Of the eight officials interviews, fifty percent indi¬ 
cated that they had utilized extensive minority contractors and workers 
with revenue sharing monies. For instance, when the commissioners bought 
buses and trucks for the county government, they were purchased from 
minority-owned dealers. The remaining three respondents stated that 
minority contractors and workers were not used extensively with revenue 
sharing money allocated specifically for capital expenditures.^ The 
reason cited (primarily) by the officials for not using minority contrac¬ 
tors extensively was that "they just were not available and did not have 
18 
what the government was looking for at that particular time." 
Additional equal opportunity and civil rights questions were asked. 
Each official was asked whether he felt the revenue sharing money was used 
(thus far) in his jurisdiction equitably? Six respondents felt that the 
spending of revenue sharing funds in their jurisdiction was done equitably, 
while two respondents felt that, the funds were spent quite to the con¬ 
trary. Data indicate that, to date, more than thirty-six percent of the 
respondents of both governments felt that the lower-income constituents 
benefited most from the manner in which revenue sharing funds were spent. 
More than twenty-six percent thought the whole community one way or another 






twelve percent of the respondents, the upper class, middle class, and black 
citizens (especially in the city) had received the greatest benefit from 
the funds. Of the six respondents, thirty-six percent indicated that they 
felt the upper strata/constituents benefited least from revenue sharing 
funds expenditures. Thirty-six percent also thought or felt that the 
poor constituents were the least beneficiaries of the funds. It should be 
noted, however, that no sector of the community filed a complaint pro¬ 
testing the officials spending decision of revenue sharing funds in 
Tuskegee or the County. Only a few verbal complaints from individuals 
• J 19 were voiced. 
Each official was further asked to explain how specifically the 
poor, near poor and minorities from major categories of expendi¬ 
tures were benefited?—Comparison with other constituencies. . . 
e.g., (if additional policemen were hired, were they black); if 
the renovation of parks, pavement of streets, fixing of street 
lights, did any of it take place in the poor, near poor and/or 
minority communities?20 
Of the six officials responding to this question, the dominant theme ex¬ 
pressed was that they had hired black personnel (deputies, for the county, 
and black policemen for the city); the pavement of streets in the city as 
well as paving county roads and building county bridges; and the fixing 
of street lights benefited, according to the officials, mainly the poor. 
Indeed, according to the respondents, since the pavement of streets and 
fixing of street lights occurred, for the most part, in the ten designated 
model city areas in Tuskegee, revenue sharing funds had to have benefited 
21 





This question was taken from the questionnaire. 
Information obtained from questionnaires. 
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Each official was asked to identify those spending categories (five 
categories were listed) in which he felt his governments future revenue 
sharing receipts should be spent. Respondents were not asked to limit 
themselves to a single choice, and all of them indicated their preferences. 
The results, summarized below, present an instructive preview of coming 
decisions in that area. 
Question: How do you feel revenue sharing funds should be 
spent in your jurisdiction for the remainder of 
1974 and in 1975? (Indicate all of your pre¬ 
ferences by placing number "1" by the appro¬ 
priate category, a "2" by your second choice, 
etc.).22 
Priorities Respondents Percent 
A. To reduce taxes 1 2 25.0 
B. To pay current bills 1 1 12.5 
C. To increase the level of current 
services (e.g., social services, 
public safety, etc.) 1 4 50.0 
D. To reduce bonded indebtedness - - - 
E. To implement new programs 1 1 12.5 
Although the questionnaire speaks for itself, stress on three conclusions 
can be seen. First, the responses suggest that revenue sharing seemed 
unlikely to trigger a rush by local officials to reduce bonded indebtedness. 
Second, new programs seemed almost unlikely to receive major support. And 
thirdly, paying current bills by local officials seem unlikely, at least for 
the time being. 
Kimmelman, Revenue Sharing and Local Government, p. 48. 
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A final observation appropriate to speculative anticipation of 
revenue sharing spending decisions in the area, is that one-half of the 
respondents would increase the level of current services (e.g., social 
services, public safety, etc.) and one-fourth of them would rush into a 
local tax reduction. 
This brings us to the last question to be assayed in this chapter, 
an analysis of the impact of black officeholders on the policy outcomes of 
their respective governing bodies. By impact, as defined previously, we 
mean, 
the reordering of priorities on the city council and commission 
and persuading them to seek novel solutions to outstanding prob¬ 
lems, particularly those especially salient in the Black com¬ 
munity; and garnering for the Black community a more equitable 
distribution of existing services and benefits provided by govern¬ 
ment. ^3 
The impact of black officeholders on reordering priorities, has been 
negligible. Even though participation on the various governing boards has 
been extensive, it is also true that black officeholders have not been 
aggressive in introducing novel policy alternatives. One can see this by 
looking at where and how much revenue sharing funds have been allocated— 
i.e., the different categories. To be sure, at the City Council and County 
Commission levels, the allocations by these black officeholders would not 
alter significantly any existing structures in the black or poor communi¬ 
ties. That is, with Macon County being as poor as it is, only 5.1 percent 
24 
of the money was given to social service fields. And, as is traditional 
capital improvement, public safety, etc., received high percentages of the 
23 
^Jones, "Black Officeholders in Local Governments," p. 68. 
^See Table 13, p. 52. 
59 
of the funds. Specifically, most of the initiatives of the black office¬ 
holders have been designed to increase the black community's share of 
existing services and benefits. That is, most of the allocations attribu¬ 
ted to these officials were made under the heading of improving services 
such as lights, pavement of streets, fixing drainage systems, etc., on 
the one hand, and improving working conditions for existing workers on 
the other. But the fact remains that there are still wide disparities 
which exist between black and white communities regarding access to govern¬ 
ment services and benefits. Consequently, there is no evidence that black 
officials in Tuskegee/Macon have been particularly aggressive in offering 
radical policy initiatives designed to re-order governmental priorities 
25 
on issues especially salient in the black community. Black officeholders 
in Macon County have not had significant success in reordering the priori¬ 
ties of the governing boards on which they serve and they have enjoyed 
only limited success in increasing the black community's share of benefits 
and services. 
In concluding our review of the spending of revenue sharing funds 
in Macon County, we can see that two distinct patterns have emerged. The 
first is the disproportionate distribution between capital and operating 
expenditures, with the emphasis being on capital expenditures. And the 
second distinct pattern is the absence of any significant spending in the 
... 26 
social service areas. 
Where did the money go? Evidence overwhelmingly supports the fact 
25 
Reference here is to such issues as better health care and facili¬ 
ties, better schools, housing, etc. 
26 
See Table 7, p. 44 and Table 13» p. 52. 
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that funds were used to improve municipal buildings, police departments, 
etc.—services favorable to the middle class—not the poor black and white 
citizens. That is, capital improvement expenditures were the clear pri¬ 
ority items of the black elected officials of Tuskegee/Macon County. 
Specifically, of the $612,000 spent on capital expenditures, most of it 
went into multi-purpose general government (35.0 percent), transportation 
(18.3 percent). Of the $390,004 spent on operating and maintenance ex¬ 
penditures, 24.1 percent was allotted to the field of financial adminis- 
. . • 27 
tration. 
Emphasis on capital expenditures reflects: (a) concern over the 
duration of revenue sharing, and (b) possible inability among local govern¬ 
ments to generate capital funds. In other words, the payments were used 
to fund projects that had been deferred for want of money in the regular, 
annual operating budgets. These projects involved constructing new build¬ 
ings, repairs to public facilities, and replacements of heavy equipment 
that the communities had not been willing or able to afford from their 
traditional revenues. Consequently, these units of local government used 
more on capital expenditures than on operating and maintenance expendi¬ 
tures. 
The survey taken in the Fall of 1974 showed that the money received 
by the localities studied was not spent for services to the poor. That is, 
with a few minor exceptions, revenue sharing funds have not been used to 
28 
meet social needs. In fact, the opposite has been true. Revenue sharing 
^See Table 10, p. 48. 
oO 
See Table 13, p. 52. 
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funds have been spent in the existing pattern of expenditures on public 
safety, and capital improvements etc.,—which is used to offset general 
budget increases and to prevent local property tax increases. Only a 
small percent (5.1) has been spent on related social service fields (health 
and education). To date, there have not been any funds allocated to the 
category of "social services for the aged and poor." 
CHAPTER V 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA USES OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING FUNDS 
It is the specific purpose of this chapter to explain, analyze and 
evaluate the impact of the spending of general revenue sharing funds in 
Atlanta, Georgia. The chapter is written in two parts: (1) the first 
part will detail the amount of general revenue sharing money distributed 
to Atlanta during the Third and Fourth Entitlement periods (January, 1973- 
June, 1974) as well as the formula used to determine this municipality's 
allocation; and (2) the second part will espound on the uses of those 
funds in Atlanta as well as the policy implications of general revenue 
sharing spending decisions to that city's government. It should be noted 
that the record of expenditures as well as the record of receipts will 
constitute the most critical ingredients of this investigation. 
Measuring the fiscal impact of revenue sharing in Atlanta was an 
admittedly difficult research problem, which this study attempted to solve 
through field investigation. That is, documenting the eventual fiscal 
impact of the funds was difficult since revenue sharing dollars served as 
a substitute for existing funds derived from other local tax sources. 
Meaning that the revenue sharing program is so flexible that localities 
can and have used the supplanted local funds for an entirely different pur¬ 
pose from that listed on the Actual Use Reports. In this respect, the high 
priority expenditure categories of the revenue sharing law are somewhat 
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illusory because it is impossible in most cases to identify what local 
funds were displaced by the new federal funds and for what purposes those 
local funds in turn were used. The city of Atlanta is a case in point. 
For these reasons, other methods besides just reviewing the Actual Use 
Reports were utilized in this study in order to trace the true impact of 
revenue sharing spending in Atlanta. Therefore, the attempt by this 
writer to identify and analyze the impact of revenue sharing in Atlanta 
or to specify the results that might have been achieved by the funds, 
required an analysis of all available revenues. 
For the year 1973 only,^ revenue sharing funds included allotments 
for the entitlement periods January 1, 1972-June 30, 1972 ($3.04 million); 
July 1, 1972-December 31, 1972 ($2.99 million); January 1, 1973-June 30, 
1973 ($3*45 million); July 1, 1973-December 31> 1973 ($1-71 million); and 
2 
payment for calendar year 1974 (some 7 million). The factors used by the 
Department of the Treasury to determine the 1972 and 1973 allocations for 
Atlanta were the following: 
3 
Per Capita Aggregate Adjusted Intergovernmental 
Population Income Income Taxes Transfers 
497,421 $3,156 $1,569860,676 $45,844,569 $14,621,000 
All general revenue sharing funds obtained by Atlanta were deposited 
in a Trust and Agency Account. Under federal regulations governing the use 
federal revenue sharing funds, this money must be maintained in a special 
Note that funds for entitlement periods in 1972 were not actually 
received until 1973- 
2 
Figures obtained from Atlanta Finance Department. 
3 
Research Atlanta, "Revenue Sharing in Atlanta and Fulton County," 
(Atlanta, Georgia: July 1973)» p. 12. 
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trust account. The Budget Commission of the City of Atlanta put the 
receipt of general revenue sharing funds into the annual budgeting pro¬ 
cess. Upon recommendation from the Finance Committee, the City Council 
approves the city budget. 
Elected officials of Atlanta easily substituted their revenue shar¬ 
ing dollars for (the period studied) expenditures they had planned to 
make with local funds. The City Council technically approved the apportion- 
4 
ment of all revenue sharing funds for firemen's salaries through 1973* 
This allocation "freed-up" some ten million in (local) General Funds 
which would have had to cover firemen's salaries for 1973* Of these 
"freed up" funds, in reality, Atlanta used a major portion (six million 
or sixty percent) to offset annual increases in general government spend¬ 
ing. That is, six million was absorbed in General Funds to alleviate 
its operating costs, including increases in city salaries. Primarily, 
these increases were caused by across-the-board salary increases for city 
personnel. Because of the extreme fungibility^ or substitution factor of 
revenue sharing dollars, it is virtually impossible to make even a guess 
as to who or which particular group or groups benefited most from the 
salary increases in Atlanta. Approximately thirty percent ($3-75 million) 
of Atlanta's grants went to capital improvements,^ (which were awaiting 
See Actual Use Reports, page 77. 
5 
Fungibility refers to the ability of a recipient government to 
allocate revenue sharing funds to an eligible category, (such as the fire 
department), and use its own "freed up" general budget money for any other 
purpose whether it be an eligible revenue category or not. 
^In an effort to provide "some kind of tax relief" (in December, 
1972), the mayor of Atlanta, who was Sam Massel1, and the then Board of 
Aldermen passed an ordinance rebating the remaining $4 million to water 
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TABLE 14 
ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS BY PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS 
IN DOLLARS AND PERCENTAGES, THE GOVERNMENT OF ATLANTA 
JANUARY, 1973-JUNE, 1974 
Actual Use Reports 
(Third & Fourth Entitlement Periods) 
Priority Expenditure 
 Categories  
Operating/ 
Capital Maintenance Percent 
Total 
1. Public Safety 
$16,815,138 100.0 
16,815,138 100.0 
2. Environmental Protection 




7. Social Services 
8. Financial Administration 
9. Multipurpose & General 
Government 
10. Education 
11. Social Development 
12. Housing & Community 
Development 
13. Economic Development 
14. Environmental Conservation 
15. Recreation Culture 
SOURCE: Department of the Treasury, Office of Revenue Sharing, 
Official Governmental Revenue Sharing Actual Use Reports for the Govern- 
of Atlanta, August 31» 1973 and August 30, 1974. 
Note: Two Actual Use Reports were combined to obtain these figures. 
What this Actual Use Report shows is the amount of revenue sharing funds 
Atlanta has received and to what category the city has allocated the funds 
from January, 1973 to June 30, 1974. It should be noted that all Atlanta‘s 
Reports show the allocation of revenue sharing funds to one particular 
category (public safety). 
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financing from excess General Funds revenue or bond monies). Less than 
ten percent ($750,000) went to support Economic Opportunity Atlanta. The 
following lists the final allocation of the $4.5 million:^ 
TABLE 15 
ATLANTA PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS 
Proqram A1location 
Traffic Improvementsî 
Hill Street widening and improvement (2) sections: 
1-20 to Memorial Dr. and Georgia Ave. to Milledge 
Cleveland Ave. Extension (Bridge over Poole Creek) 
Greenbriar Parkway Bridge over Atlanta Coastline RR 
Forrest Ave. Extension, Peachtree to W. Peachtree 
Bolton Road Widening, Marietta Blvd. to Marietta Rd. 








Parks Acquisition, Development, and Major Repair 
Support of Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc. 
Reserve for Acquisition of Site for new Criminal 
Justice Complex 
Traffic Control Signals and Equipment 
Library Development and Expansion 








As one can see, regardless of the specificity with which Atlanta's Reve¬ 
nue Sharing Account is maintained, the real effect of the funds were 
and sewer customers—about $44 for each account. A suit was filed in 
Federal District Court based on the inequality of the rebates which 
resulted in Judge Richard C. Freeman "permanently enjoining" the City 
of Atlanta from rebating the money. This legal ruling forced the City 
to reallocate the money. 
^Research Atlanta, "Revenue Sharing in Atlanta and Fulton County," 
p. 14 
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much different from the direct uses shown by the Actual Use Reports (see 
page 77). Thus, because of the displacement factor, the real impact of 
the federal funds could conceivably never be known by the average citizen. 
The impact of the new federal revenue sharing program upon Atlanta's 
operating needs was significant. In the absence of revenue sharing funds 
in 1973, the City would have had to resort to a property tax increase 
in order to provide only limited service improvements and to finance 
comprehensive salary adjustments. That is, without this additional source 
of untied federal funds, Atlanta might have been forced to increase ad 
valorem taxes in 1973 in order to finance normal growth of the General 
Budget—service improvements and salary adjustments for city employees. 
Indeed, the cost of providing basic municipal services such as 
fire and police protection, library services, recreation programs, build¬ 
ing and housing code inspections, etc., has been increasing over the past 
decade at an average annual rate of approximately 13-1 percent in Atlanta. 
The major portion of all budget increases each year has been associated 
with programed regular salary increments for existing personnel as well 
as across-the-board increases and the staggering effect of inflation. The 
revenues to pay these increases have traditionally come from property taxes, 
business licenses, alcohol taxes and other local sources. In contrast 
with the 13-1 percent growth rate for General Fund expenditures, Atlanta's 
property tax base has grown at an annual rate of only 6.6 percent within 
the past ten years with no certainty as to whether future growth will 
continue at even this rate. In 1973» the growth in general fund-related 
g 
spending again increased about 14 percent or $10.5 million. This increase 
8 
This includes the 1973 general fund budget $74.9 million and the 
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of course, was offset by general revenue sharing funds. Thus, Atlanta's 
spending continued to grow as usual but it used general revenue sharing 
funds to offset increases in property and other local taxes in 1973» 
Budget problems in Atlanta were more severe in 1974. This was because 
the City of Atlanta received less than seven million dollars in general 
revenue sharing funds compared to ten million in 1973* However, the city's 
needs increased in 1974 as usual by some eleven million. Again, and 
according to the Actual Use Reports, the government of Atlanta appropri¬ 
ated its revenue sharing funds for firemen's salaries in 1974. That is, 
nineteen seventy four was no exception to 1973*s revenue sharing appro¬ 
priation (see Actual Use Reports, page 77)« Revenue sharing was reduced 
g 
by some 3 million, in 1974 while spending needs increased by about $11 
million over the previous year. As a result of the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act, Atlanta's revenue gap (for 1974) was again significantly 
reduced. 
So far, in reviewing this section, we find that general revenue 
sharing has been used in Atlanta (from January, 1973-June, 1974) to offset 
increases in general government expenditures, stabilize property taxes and 
to replace, partly, cutbacks in a social agency—Economic Opportunity. 
Yet, in reviewing the Actual Use Reports, one would think Atlanta used 
revenue sharing funds for only firemen salary. This study has found that 
new Trust and Agency Account for general revenue sharing $10.5 million 
which totaled $85.4 million or 14 percent increase over the 1972 budget. 
g 
This decrease from 1973 came about because some funds promised 
in 1972 did not arrive until 1973» Therefore, 19731s allocation included 
also 1972*s; whereas, 1974's allocation was for that year alone. 
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the Actual Use Reports were true only indirectly. Thus, Atlanta being a 
large city facing serious fiscal pressures, has tended to use revenue 
sharing funds mainly to provide tax relief or just to make ends meet. 
Looking further into Atlanta*s spending patterns, the data for the 
period covered suggest that the decisions are made in much the same manner 
as the decisions by which municipal or local governments have customarily 
been made. That is, data about the locality studied clearly indicate that 
programs which received high priority traditionally (i.e., with regular 
local tax money and not federal money with strings attached), received 
correspondingly high priority when local officials expended general reve¬ 
nue sharing receipts in Atlanta. To be sure, just as public safety (fire 
department) and salary increases received a high percentage of the regular 
local budget, so too were they the main beneficiaries of revenue sharing 
funds. 
A distinct absence of any significant spending in the social services 
areas^ has emerged from the expenditure choices of revenue sharing funds 
in Atlanta. That is, one should note that social service is at the bottom 
in priorities. Since Atlanta's spending distribution pattern has omitted 
significant attention to the special requirements of the poor, this raises 
serious questions about responsiveness on the part of local officials toward 
the needs of a large segment of their population. 
Since there are no legal requirements (in the revenue sharing program) 
that citizens or segments of the community be consulted on the state or 
local level, just how did these local officials in Atlanta set their pri¬ 
orities for use of revenue sharing funds, or what criteria (if any) did 
they use to decide the priorities? In the Fall of 1974 and Spring of 
10 
See Table 14, page 65 
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1975» questionnaires were administered personally or mailed to all twenty 
elected public officials in Atlanta. A total of eleven officials answered 
questionnaires. Simply put, most respondents stated that their govern¬ 
ment’s priorities were established by the City Council’s Finance Com¬ 
mittee.^ All officials that responded further revealed, in their ques¬ 
tionnaires, that the priority-setting process was publicized; mostly through 
the local newspapers the Atlanta Constitution and Atlanta Journal. 
Of the eleven officials responding to my questionnaire in Atlanta, 
five felt that the "community involvement" in priority-setting in the 
spending of revenue sharing funds was "minor;" and three stated that there 
was "no involvement." It should be noted that three officials had no com¬ 
ment on this question. The most frequently utilized type of activity to 
influence revenue sharing spending decisions (but not necessarily success¬ 
fully done) was through public hearings and City Council meetings. The 
most interested and involved organizations or groups as mentioned by re¬ 
spondents were Atlanta’s Office of Economic Opportunity personnel, and the 
Day Care industries in the city. Another respondent stated that black 
organizations of all types were indeed interested and involved. Still, 
others stated that there were a few individual citizens who did show and 
12 
expressed involvement in their government. 
A question was asked to determine the degree of deliberation and 
debate between the elected officials in Atlanta when spending priorities 
^It should be noted that two respondents stated that the priorities 
for the spending of revenue sharing was set by Atlanta’s former mayor, Sam 
Massel1, when he decided to allocate the funds to firemen salaries. 
12 
Information obtained by questionnaires. 
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were set. A majority of the respondents (six out of eleven) indicated 
that there were minor deliberation and debate within their government 
when priorities for revenue sharing funds were decided. Three other 
respondents indicate that, within the government, no deliberation and 
1 3 
debate had taken place. 
Additional questions were asked. Each official was asked whether 
he felt the revenue sharing money was used (thus far) in his jurisdiction 
equitably? Six respondents felt that the spending of revenue sharing 
funds in Atlanta was not used equitably, while four others felt the oppo¬ 
site. That is, four felt the funds were spent equitably. Data indicate 
that, to date, two of the respondents felt that no particular segment in 
Atlanta benefited most from the manner in which revenue sharing funds 
were spent. The white community, according to one respondent, benefited 
most from the expenditure pattern of revenue sharing funds. To the con¬ 
trary of the above, another respondent felt that low income blacks were 
the greatest beneficiaries of the federal funds. Still another respondent 
stated that city employees received the greatest share. And finally, one 
respondent not only narrowed the beneficiaries to city employees, but 
14 
specifically to the city firemen. Of the four respondents, answering 
the above question, three indicated that they felt the poor and/or black 
people benefited least from revenue sharing expenditures. One lone respon¬ 
dent thought that the middle income whites were the least recipients of 
1 3 
Information obtained from questionnaires. 
14 
Five of the eleven respondents refused to answer this particular 
question. 
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the revenue sharing funds.^ 
Each official was asked to identify those spending categories (five 
categories were listed) in which he felt his government's future revenue 
sharing receipts should be spent. Respondents were not asked to limit 
themselves to a single choice, and all (i.e., the eight that responded to 
this question) indicated their preferences. The results summarized below, 
present an instructive preview of coming decisions. 
Question: How do you feel revenue sharing funds 
should be spent in your jurisdiction 
for the remainder of the program?!6 
Priorities Respondents Percentage 
A. To reduce taxes 1 1 11 
B. To pay current bills 1 3 33 
C. To increase the level of current 
service (e.g., social services, 
public safety, etc.) 1 5 56 
D. To reduce bonded indebtedness 
E. To implement new programs. 
Although the questionnaire speaks for itself, stress on two conclus¬ 
ions can be seen. First, the responses suggest that revenues sharing seem 
unlikely to trigger a rush by Atlanta officials to reduce bonded indebted¬ 
ness. And secondly, implementation of new programs is not going to receive 
any support in the future. 
1 5 
It should be noted that the National Welfare Rights Organization 
did file a complaint protesting the spending decisions regarding revenue 
sharing funds in Atlanta. 
^ ^Kimmelman, Revenue Sharing and Local Government, p. 48. 
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This brings us to the last question to be considered in this chapter. 
An analysis of the impact of black officeholders on the policy outcomes 
of their respective governing bodies—the legislative and executive branches 
of Atlanta. 
The impact^ of black officeholders in reorder priorities in Atlanta 
has not been positive. One can see this by looking at where and how much 
revenue sharing funds have been allocated—i.e., to the different cate¬ 
gories that are salient in the Black community. To be sure, the allocations 
by these black officeholders would not alter significantly any existing 
structures in the black or poor communities. Consequently, there is no 
evidence that black officials in Atlanta have been particularly aggressive 
in offering radical policy initiatives designed to reorder governmental 
priorities on issues especially salient in the black community. 
In concluding our review of the spending of revenue sharing funds in 
Atlanta, we can see two basic patterns. The first is the disproportionate 
distribution between capital and operating expenditures, with the emphasis 
being on operating expenditures. And the second pattern was the absence 
of any significant spending in the social service areas. That is, opera¬ 
ting expenditures (such as personnel salaries) were the clear priority 
items of the elected officials of Atlanta. In fact, revenue sharing funds 
have been spent in the existing or traditional pattern of expenditure; on 
public safety, etc.,—which were used to offset general budget increases 
and to prevent local property tax increases. Only a small percent has been 
/ 
^For the definition of impact, see Chapter IV, page 58. 
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spent on related 
date, there have 
services for the 
social service fields (Economic Opportunity Atlanta), 
not been any funds allocated to the category of "social 
aged and poor."^ 
18 
To 
See Actual Use Reports, page 77 
CHAPTER VI 
NATIONAL TREND IN THE SPENDING OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS 
At some point every major social legislative act should be reviewed, 
data collected and analyzed, and conclusions drawn in order to determine 
its effect or impact on the national level. Unfortunately, the day-to-day 
operations of the revenue sharing program nationally does not lend to easy 
evaluation. But a body of evidence, nevertheless, has been accumulated. 
Several major national studies assessing general revenue sharing have been 
mounted—by the Brookings Institution, the General Accounting Office, the 
National Revenue Sharing Project, the National Urban Coalition, the League 
of Women Voters, the Center for Community Change, and the Center for Na¬ 
tional Policy Review. On the basis of these studies, it is clear that 
there are controversies and serious problems over current spending patterns 
nationally. This chapter is concerned with general revenue sharing's 
spending patterns. That is, its application and impact nationally. The 
bulk of this chapter is comprised of an analysis of two major policy issues. 
These are: (1) the responsiveness of local officials (through revenue 
sharing spending decisions) to the needs of the disadvantaged nationally, 
and (2) the extent revenue sharing has been used as a substitution for 
categorical programs and/or general budget monies nationally. 
We will first look at large cities' (50,000 and above) spending pat¬ 
terns and use Atlanta in a comparison. Secondly, the nation’s smaller cities 
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(49,000 to 2,500) will be compared with Macon County and Tuskegee, Alabama 
revenue sharing spending patterns. Thirdly, all localities (counties, 
cities, townships, etc.,) will be espounded on as well. Fourthly, a dis¬ 
cussion will be given on state government expenditure patterns nationally. 
And fifthly, a special analysis of the cutbacks of categorical programs on 
large cities will be given; comparing Atlanta with five other cities of 
comparable population. 
A study designed to keep track of what happens as a large new domes¬ 
tic program goes into effect must begin by examining first the cities 
nationally since they constitute the majority of America’s population and 
will therefore receive the major portion of revenue sharing funds. In that 
respect, the chief administrative officers of all cities with populations 
of 50,000 or more were surveyed at the close of the Fourth Entitlement 
period (July 1, 1973-June 30, 1974) in the Summer of 1974. Taken as a 
whole, the major findings were that city governments used the bulk of their 
revenue sharing funds to support a narrow range of essential services and 
placed relatively little of the money into new programs. The survey also 
revealed that revenue sharing helped stabilize city taxes. 
Specifically, the large cities invested most of their revenue shar¬ 
ing funds in traditional municipal services that have always had priority 
in city budgets. That is, 66 percent of the revenue sharing funds allocated 
were spent for five services: law enforcement, fire protection, street 
repair, environmental protection, and parks and recreation in that order.^ 
^David A. Caputo and Richard L. Cole, "National Opinion Poll Reveals 
Big City Leaders Pleas," in Public Administration Review 35, No. 2 (March/ 
April, 1975): 139. 
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This study further revealed that revenue sharing in large cities 
did not finance many new programs or activities in the major expenditure 
areas. That is, nearly 70 percent of the funds allocated (to public safety, 
road maintenance, fire protection, etc.) have been used for ongoing ser¬ 
vices. On the other hand, revenue sharing funds did finance a few new 
programs in other budget areas in the large cities. The same study showed 
that 25 percent or more of these revenue sharing funds allocated for li¬ 
braries, social services, parks and recreation, transit, and health na- 
2 
tionally have been used for new programs. 
Although more than a third of the large-city governments thought the 
revenue sharing program had no impact on 1974 municipal taxes, twelve per¬ 
cent reported a tax reduction, thirty-six percent said the program pre¬ 
vented a tax increase, and the remaining 17 percent felt the program held 
down the rate of increase in taxes. In addition, more than 75 percent of 
the large-city governmental officials pointed out that revenue sharing will 
have the long-range effect of either preventing a tax increase or reducing 
the rate. Thus, many of the larger cities used general revenue sharing 
funds (as opposed to increasing taxes) to meet very real municipal fiscal 
crisis (66 percent maintenance and operation). But, they used still a large 
proportion (34 percent) of their general revenue sharing funds on capital 
4 
expenditure items. 
2Ibid., p. 139- 
^Ibid., p. 141. 
Zj. 
Graham W. Watts, "The Administration's View: Continuation and 
Expansion," Nation's Cities 13 (February 1975): 20. 
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In comparing Atlanta's spending patterns with the above findings, one 
can see that there is a correlation. That is, Atlanta's revenue sharing 
spending emphasis was on operating expenditures instead of capital out¬ 
lays. Hardly any thought was given to new programs and social services 
5 
nationally. So was the case with Atlanta. Just as general revenue shar¬ 
ing has been used to prevent increases in large cities taxes nationally, 
Atlanta provided no exception to this trend. 
Conversely, smaller-city (49,000 to 2,500) governments have concen¬ 
trated most of their spending quite the opposite. Capital outlays received 
70.8 percent while operating and maintenance received only 29.2 percent.^ 
Specifically, large amounts of federal revenue sharing were used by small 
cities for "capital expense" such as construction of fire houses and police 
stations, purchase of new equipment and road repair. These governments 
devoted the rest of the funds in various ways to what is termed "substitu¬ 
tion uses" whereby shared revenue has been used to offset a tax or to dis¬ 
place funds that otherwise would have been provided from municipal tax 
sources. Thus, according to the study, smaller and less densely populated 
cities, as compared to larger cities, have tended to use a higher propor¬ 
tion of their shared revenue for new capital purposes. 
In comparing the city of Tuskegee, Alabama (which has a population 
of 11,000) with the nation's small cities, the expenditure emphasis was 
on operating and maintenance not on capital. That is, the city of Tuskegee 
spent its revenue sharing money in direct contrast to that of cities its 
size nationally, The distribution of revenue sharing funds, from January 
^See Atlanta's Actual Use Reports, Chapter V, page 65. 
^See Table 16, page 79. 
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TABLE 16 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING—STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
JANUARY 1, 1973-JUNE 30, 1974 
Recipient Governments Number 
Total, All receipts 39,156 
States and District of Columbia 51 
County Governments 3,046 
Cities, towns, boroughs 18,727 
Townships 16,986 
Indian Tribes, Alaskan Native Villages 346 
Expenditures From 1/1/73 to 6/30/74 Amount Percent 
Total for al 1 purposes $9-5 bill ion 100.0 
Operations and Maintenance 6.1 " 64.0 
Capital Outlay 3.4 " 36.0 
Revenue Sharing Expenditure (Capital & Operating) By Population 
Actual Expenditures for 1974 
Percent Operating Percent 
Cities by Population Class and Maintenance Capital 
Total 58.0 42.0 
1,000,000+ 94.0 6.0 
500,000 to 999,999 71.0 29.0 
250,000 to 499,999 62.0 38.0 
100,000 to 249,999 51.0 49.0 
50,000 to 99,999 52.0 48.0 
Sub-total 66.0 34.0 
25,000 to 49,999 40.0 60.0 
10,000 to 24,999 30.0 70.0 
5,000 to 9,999 29.0 71.0 
2,500 to 4,999 24.0 76.0 
Under 2,500 23.0 77.0 
Sub-total 29.2 70.8 
SOURCE: Office of Revenue Sharing, January, 1975 • 
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1973-June, 1974, Tuskegee spent some sixty-one percent (61.2) on operating 
expenditures compared to some twenty-nine (29.2) percent for the same 
category nationally. Capital expenditures in Tuskegee accounted for some 
twenty-five percent (25.4), but nationally (for cities this size) capital 
expenditures accounted for some seventy percent (70.8).^ What this tells 
us is that Tuskegee1s expenditure patterns do not coincide with the 
national average for small cities. Rather, Tuskegee’s patterns coincides 
more with the expenditure patterns of larger cities. Evidence shows that 
while Tuskegee spent 61 percent on operating or on going services, large 
cities spent 66 percent. Also, while officials in Tuskegee spent twenty- 
five percent on capital expenditures, large cities nationally spent some 
thirty-four percent for capital. Thus, Tuskegee's use of revenue sharing 
was an exception to how these federal funds have been expended for cities 
its size nationally. 
Turning to a composite of all localities—county governments, muni¬ 
cipalities, townships, large and small, etc.,—officials were queried in 
1973 on the impact of revenue sharing funds on taxes and new spending. 
The results were the following: (1) total new spending for local govern¬ 
ment was 57.5 percent. Out of this amount, new capital expenditures took 
46 percent; and (2) total substitutions of revenue sharing funds in 1973 
for local governments was 42.5 percent. Of this amount, tax reduction took 
3.5 percent, tax stabilization 13.8 percent, program maintenance 12.6 per¬ 
cent, federal aid restoration .3 percent and the category of "other" took 
g 
2.8 percent. 
^See Table 16, page 79. 
g 
See Table 17, page 81. 
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TABLE 17 
USES OF REVENUE SHARING BY THE SAMPLE JURISDICTIONS: MEAN 






New Spending: 57.5 35.7 
New Capital 46.0 21.6 
Expanded operations 10.8 11.6 
Increased pay and benefits .8 0.0 
Unallocated 0.0 2.5 
Substitutions: 42.5 64.3 
Tax reduction 3.5 3.0 
Tax stabi1ization 13.8 0.0 
Program maintenance 12.6 15.3 
Borrowing avoidance 9.5 3.3 
Federal aid restoration .3 3.0 
Other 2.8 4.5 
Unallocated 0.0 25.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Based on responses for eight state governments and fifty-five 
local units. Two local governments in the sample had not allocated 
shared revenue as of June 30, 1973 and are not included in this tabu- 
1 ation. 
SOURCE: The Brookings Institution, Brookings Study, p. 158. 
Their study was geographically well dispersed. That is, the 56 local 
governments (29 cities, 21 counties, 6 townships and 1 Indian tribe) 
in the sample ranged in size from New York City to two small rural town¬ 
ships in Wisconsin. 
In 1974, using the composite of all localities, only four percent 
of the governments responding to the above question said that they were 
able to reduce local taxes; thirty-five percent said that revenue sharing 
had prevented new taxes. Thirty-four percent stated that the funds enabled 
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them to maintain taxes at the current levels; and twenty-seven percent 
9 
stated that they had been able to prevent new taxes. 
The Office of Revenue Sharing Actual Use Reports also asked locali¬ 
ties whether revenue sharing funds enabled them to prevent new debts or 
reduce old debts in 1974. Responses from 12,713 local officials indicated 
that 84 percent of those responding had been able to prevent new debt 
because of revenue sharing funds. However, revenue sharing enabled 16 
percent (of the local governments who responded to the question) to reduce 
old debts.^ 
The above study further showed in 1974 that local governments spent 
36 percent of their revenue sharing monies on public safety. They allo¬ 
cated 19 percent of their funds to public transportation, 11 percent on 
general government capital expenditures, and ten percent to environmental 
protection. Health (7 percent), and Recreation (at 6 percent) were next 
in the order of priority. The remaining ten percent of local revenue 
sharing funds was divided among the other priority categories—social 
service (2 percent), housing and community development (1 percent), li¬ 
braries (2 percent), economic development (1 percent), and financial ad¬ 
ministration (3 percent).^ 
Turning briefly to the state governments, it was found that these 
governments had an even higher level of substitute use of revenue sharing 
than local governments in 1973» In state budgets nationally, more than 
9 
Revenue Sharing Bulletin, "General Revenue Sharing: Reported 
Uses 1973-1974," (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Treasury, Office 
of Revenue Sharing, January, 1975), p. 2. 
^Ibid., p. 2. 
^See Table 18, page 83. 
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TABLE 18 
USE OF REVENUE SHARING FUNDS REPORTED BY STATES AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: JANUARY 1, 1973-JUNE 30, 1974 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
Rank Cateqory of Use 
All 
Govern¬ 




1 Public Safety $2,190 23.0 $ 45. 1.0 $2,145. 36.0 
2 Education 2,068 21.0 2,000. 57.0 68. 1.0 
3 Transportation 1,405 15.0 267. 8.0 M38. 19.0 
4 General Govern- 
ment/Multi- 
Purpose 841. 9.0 208. 6.0 633. 11.0 
5 Environmental 
Protection 674. 7.0 56. 2.0 618. 10.0 
6 Health 645 7.0 231. 7.0 414. 7.0 
7 Recreation and 
Cultural Services 425. 4.0 40. 1.0 385. 6.0 
8 Other 355. 4.0 316. 9.0 39. 1.0 
9 Social Services for 
the Poor and Aged 354. 4.0 229. 7.0 125. 2.0 
10 Financial Adminis¬ 
tration 188. 2.0 24. 7.0 164. 3.0 
11 Housing & Community 
Development 104. 1.0 37. 1.0 67. 1.0 
12 Libraries 101. 1.0 6. - 95. 2.0 
13 Economic Development 51. 1.0 13. - 38. 1.0 
14 Corrections 43. - 43. 1.0 - - 
15 Social Development 22. - - - 22. - 
Total $9,466. 100.0 $3,515. 100.0 $5,951. 100.0 
SOURCE: Office of Revenue Sharing, January 1975. 
64 percent of the federal revenue sharing funds went to "substitutions" such 
as tax cuts. Specifically, revenue sharing for substitutions on the state 
level nationally in 1973 were as follows: program maintenance on the state 
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level took 15.3 percent} tax reduction 3*0 percent; borrowing and avoid¬ 
ance 3«3 percent; federal aid restoration 3.0 percent; the category of 
"other" received 4.5 percent; and lastly state governments refused to 
allocate 25 percent of their 1973 revenue sharing funds. On the other 
hand, the total "new spending" in 1973 for the state was 35-7» of which 21.6 
12 
percent went to expanded operations. 
The Office of Revenue Sharing also queried state governments on the 
impact of revenue sharing funds on taxes in 1974. State officials were 
asked whether such funds had enabled their government (for Entitlement 
Period Four—July, 1973 through June, 1974) to prevent new taxes, reduce 
taxes, prevent increased taxes or maintain current tax levels? Only 25 
governors responded to the question. Of them, 60 percent said that they 
were able to reduce state taxes because of revenue sharing; 20 percent 
said that they were able to prevent new sources of taxes; 12 percent said 
that the funds enabled them to maintain current tax levels; and 8 percent 
13 said that the funds prevented a tax increase. According to the above 
study, 29 governors (58 percent) indicated that they had been able to 
prevent new debt because of revenue sharing funds. But, that revenue 
sharing enabled only six percent of the state governments (those who 
responded to the question) to reduce old debts. 
Citing the same study, states spent 57 percent of their revenue 
sharing funds for education in 1974. State governments distributed much 
12 
Richard P. Nathan, "The Brookings Study: Meeting Expectations 
But Some Changes Needed," Nations Cities 13 (February 1975) s 23. 
13 Revenue Sharing Bulletin, "General Revenue Sharing: Reported 
Uses 1973-1974," p. 2. 
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of the remainder of their revenue sharing funds among public transportation 
(8 percent), health services (7 percent), multi-purpose and general govern- 
14 
ment (6 percent), and social services for the poor or aged (7 percent). 
In reviewing the spending of revenue sharing funds nationally, 
relatively little money was invested in social services and health pro¬ 
grams usually associated with the needs of low-income groups. That is, 
nationally, poor people received a very small share of the revenue shar¬ 
ing program^ benefits. At this point, it is necessary to discuss the 
costs to poor people as a result of general revenue sharing not being used 
for traditional social programs by local officials. To begin with, we 
must ask what categorical program expenditures are gone as a result of the 
untied revenue sharing money. An examination of the 1974 national budget, 
which markedly reduced the Community Action Agencies and the growth rate 
of other categorical programs that were beneficial to the impoverished, 
reveals that the cost to the poor was quite extensive.^ Since the imple¬ 
mentation of general revenue sharing, categorical grants for social welfare 
programs have decreased drastically. 
In the fiscal 1973 budget, the Nixon Administration called for $9.4 
billion for four programs. The 1974 budget for the same programs was $6.9 
billion, a decrease of some $2.5 billion.^ The discrepancy between 1973 
and 1974 budgets is shown dramatically in Table 19.^ In fact, the fiscal 





See Table 18, page 83. 





COMPARISON OF FUNDS PROPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IN COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING FOR 1973 AND 1974 
Categories 
Funds 
(In Millions of 
 1973?  
Dollars) 
1974 
Community Development Programs 
Urban renewal 1,000 137 
Model cities 620 0 
Rehabilitation loans 70 0 
Neighborhood facilities 40 0 
Water and sewer 200 0 
Public facility loans 40 0 
Open space 100 0 
Subtotal 2,070 137 
Federal Assistance for Housing 
Public housing 473 350 
Section 235 150 0 
Section 236^ 170 0 
Rent supplements 48 0 
Subtotal 841 350 
Grand Total 2,911 487 
aNew program commitment level prior to the freeze. 
^Sections 235 and 236 of the 1968 Housing and Urban Development 
Act provided government assistance to low-income and lower-middle income 
families. 
SOURCE: A New Federalism, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, 
United States Senate, 93rd Cong. Part I, February 21, 25, 28 and March 
8, 14, 15, 1973 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1973), p. 30. 
87 
programs took effect in 1974. Thus, a fiscal gap of one year. 
The impact of the "new federalism" (general revenue sharing) on 
America nationally is quite significant and can now be generalized. 
First, the intent to substitute general revenue sharing funds for cate¬ 
gorical aid programs represents a gigantic double-cross to the rural poor 
and especially the city poor in America. That is, in contrast to the 
expectations of most city mayors who thought that current levels of grants- 
in-aid would be maintained, the funds from general revenue sharing dropped 
in billions for most social programs. Secondly, since such programs as 
housing, job training, and health suffered the worst cuts, revenue sharing 
has affected the very quality of life for poor citizens. In other words, 
it affected the kind of neighborhood citizens live in, housing for the 
elderly, as well as health care and jobs. 
Finally, for this chapter let us now analyze closely the affect 
(double cross) general revenue sharing has had on a few cities in the 
United States. Yes, the double cross was very apparent nationally to 
large cities. This can be seen more vividly by looking at six major cities* 
18 
losses from cutbacks in categorical aid. In 1974, Milwaukee expected to 
lose some $95 million in federal aid. As it turned out, housing and neigh¬ 
borhood renewal alone were slashed by $49 million. Milwaukee was allotted 
only $11 million of general revenue sharing funds during the first year. 
The only other compensation to this city was special revenue sharing funds 
for community development, which helped make the net loss $79 million 
19 
instead of $95 million. 
18 
19 
See Table 20 
Ibid. 
» page 88. 
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TABLE 20 
EXPECTED LOSS IN CATEGORICAL AID 
(In Mill ions of 
FOR SIX CITIES 
Dollars) 






Sharinq Net Loss 
Newark 196 10 186 
San Francisco 47 20 27 
Seattle 98 9 89 
Milwaukee 95 16 79 
Gary 21 4 17 
Atlanta 20 7 13* 
SOURCE: Fourth Entitlement Period Allocations, Department of the 
Treasury (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973)» 
pp. 19-23. A New Federalism, hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter¬ 
governmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, United 
States Senate, 93rd Cong., Part I, February 21, 23» 28 and March 8, 14, 
15» 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). 
«'Atlanta's figures were obtained from a different source. Research 
Atlanta, "Revenue Sharing in Atlanta and Fulton County," (Atlanta, Georgia: 
July 1973), p. 3. 
Newark, New Jersey fared even worse under the "new federalism." 
Two hundred and twenty-nine federally funded programs were cut back by 
$186 million. Such programs as health, lost more than $6 million and 
Community Action projects also incurred severe losses. To plug this 
20 
discrepancy, Newark received only $10 million dollars in revenue sharing. 
San Francisco suffered pretty much the same fate as Newark. This 
89 
city did receive a general revenue sharing check of $20 million, but it 
did not keep the city from losing some 27 million dollars in categorical 
* 21 grants. 
In Seattle, the formula under the "new federalism" was very devasta¬ 
ting. This city received, in 1974, approximately $9 million in general 
revenue sharing funds. However, nearly $98 million was impounded or cut 
from the budget, giving the city a net loss of $89 million in federal 
Gary, Indiana anticipated $21 million in federal monies in 1973. 
As a result of federal budgetary action, that figure was reduced to less 
than $10 million. Fiscal 1974, Gary's general revenue sharing check was 
only four million dollars. That year’s categorical net loss was $17 
23 million. 
In 1974, Atlanta received approximately $7 million in general reve¬ 
nue sharing funds, but lost $20 million in federal funds due to termina¬ 
tions and cutbacks of categorical grant programs (compared to the 1972 
funding level). This made a net loss to Atlanta for that year $13 mil- 
Based on the above facts, the double-cross system has created serious 
hardships for the poor in the cities studied. There is no indication that 









dollars to abandoned social welfare programs. Just the opposite has 
25 
occurred nationally. One notes that there has not been a significant 
federal aid restoration of funds to social services. In this regard, then, 
general revenue sharing has created a political climate in which specific 
categorical grants have been reduced or terminated with no mandate for 
these funds to replace them. The Nixon Administration broke its own 
promise (i.e., not to treat general revenue sharing as a substitute for 
categorical aid) and has used these funds instead as a vanguard to dis- 
26 
mantle existing grants-in-aid programs. 
In general, we have found that poor people received but a small frac¬ 
tion of the benefits thus far from the more than $30 billion untied funds 
that state and local governments have and will be receiving until 1977 
under the general revenue sharing program. Thus, a program of untied grants 
to state and local governments financed at the expense of existing cate¬ 
gorical grant programs has been extremely regressive. Unless the uses of 
revenue sharing funds are grossly redirected, the "new federalism" will 
continue to make the lives of poor individuals even more intolerable. 
Nationally, then, these findings indicate that, when given the discretion 
in the allocation of federal funds through general revenue sharing, most 
localities (with black or white officials) will not choose to continue 
previous program commitments to the poor. 
25 
See Tables 17 and 18, pages 81 and 83. 
26 
Gerald R. Wheeler, "New Federalism and the Cities: A Double 
Cross," Social Work 19 (November 1974): 664. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In America, power and money tend to go together. Power in this 
federal system has flowed toward Washington over the decades, largely 
because Washington has had the greater or superior taxing powers; there¬ 
fore, more money than state and local governments to deal effectively with 
the nation's major domestic problems through autonomous federal programs 
and agencies. The advent of general revenue sharing has, however, reversed 
this trend and revitalized state and local governments by providing a 
"new" access to federal financial resources. That is, local governments 
have received new access to financial resources from Congress in the form 
of revenue sharing which has few or no strings attached. Meaning, local 
elected officials may choose their own priorities (from a broad list of 
eight categories) for revenue sharing funding or continue to support pre¬ 
vious federal programs. One should note that general revenue sharing was 
initially sold by the Nixon Administration as supplementary or "new" money. 
The consequence of this is that local governments have not only acquired 
new money and power but a significant amount to help deal with their domes¬ 
tic needs. 
Throughout the course of this study, policy questions were asked: 
Would local black officials use their new-found money and power wisely 
and effectively in dealing with the domestic challenges (financially) 
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confronting them? Was the benefits of revenue sharing realized for the 
poor, (particularly blacks)? If so, what level of service was provided 
or what was the budget for the service? And, were local officials basing 
or claiming their decisions on "efficiency," "economy," or service con¬ 
siderations even when the real grounds for the decisions might have been 
to satisfy the political demands of certain individuals and/or groups? 
The answers to these questions were sought in the previous chapters— 
particularly chapters four, five and six—by assessing and evaluating 
general revenue sharing spending patterns. That is, it was the purpose 
of these chapters to explain, analyze, and evaluate the impact of the 
spending of general revenue sharing funds in Macon County and Tuskegee, 
Alabama, and Atlanta, Georgia as well as the program's impact nationally. 
Some generalizations can now be derived from this study. First, 
black people should look upon revenue sharing with skeptical eyes, or 
see it as an instrument that is employed for the benefit of the rich and 
middle class people to the detriment of black and poor people. Secondly, 
while local governments, under the present revenue sharing laws, have wide 
latitude in allocating funds for governmental operational costs, a very 
oppressive ceiling is placed on the amount of money allocatable to welfare 
programs. Thirdly, this category (social services for the poor and aged) 
has been given the least attention. Fourthly, the effect of the $2.5 bil¬ 
lion limitation of federal outlays for social services is that such funds 
are distributed to each state on the basis of population rather than on 
the basis of need. Fifthly, distribution according to population rather 
than need means that some states have and will continue to receive far less 
than they requested or needed, while others have gotten and will continue 
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to get more than needed. And sixthly, states with larger numbers of black 
and poor people in urban centers are seriously hurt by the resulting cut¬ 
backs in categorical programs and services. 
Generally speaking, revenue sharing is feared as a return to "States 
Rights." Historically, a concept under which blacks were frequently denied 
their rights to anything. Revenue sharing has become the transfer of 
federal commitment from the poor/black dwellers in this country to the 
middle class tax payers. For instance, they're using revenue sharing for 
activities of little need or interest to the black masses, among which is 
the beautification of municipal golf courses at the expense of paving roads, 
closing ditches, and putting up street lights in low income neighborhoods. 
Conclusively speaking, black and poor people have been adversely af¬ 
fected because of revenue sharing. Blacks have been hurt because certain 
federal programs are discontinued or so severely cutback thet the programs 
are no longer effective. Just because the greatest portion of revenue 
sharing funds have gone to the most populous states, this did not mean, 
however, that blacks were automatically the primary recipients. In fact, 
as has been noted earlier, it is just the opposite. That is, once the 
funds were received by local officials, they used them to benefit the 
status quo. Thus, this study's principal finding is: Given the existing 
political and economic institutions in this country, the trend toward a 
more decentralized federal system has been severely detrimental to poor 
people. 
Recommendations 
It is recommended here that Congress make several changes in the 
revenue sharing allocation formula if the program is extended. Since the 
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reporting categories (Actual Use Reports) are too general to be meaningful, 
the essential recommendation is that more stringent, specific reporting 
requirements be incorporated into the program. For there is a lack of 
clear, accurate information about revenue sharing which has had an adverse 
impact upon an effective citizen involvement in local expenditure decisions. 
A number of technical changes ought to be made in the formula from 
which the money is distributed. That is the formula should be rewritten 
to give more money to large cities and cut back payments to small, wealthy 
districts. 
Population is an important factor in allocating revenue sharing money 
to recipient governments. It should be noted that the 1970 Census did not 
count some of the population. This problem is known as "underemuneration" 
and contributes to inequities in revenue sharing allocations. A juris¬ 
diction could lose a full per capita share for every person not counted 
in the census figures. Blacks and the poor were undercounted more than 
other elements of the population. Consequently, it is the large urban 
centers and some rural communities (whose populations are becoming in¬ 
creasingly black and poverty stricken) that are affected most when adjust¬ 
ments are not made. The need for more current data is quite apparent be¬ 
cause population, income and tax circumstances change significantly from 
year to year. Since census data changes can have an immense effect on 
variations in amounts allocated to local governments between one entitle¬ 
ment period and the next, data used in the calculations need updating 
regularly. That is, in order for each local recipient to receive its fair 
share of revenue sharing funds, the data—population, per capita income 
and taxes—which determine local allocations, be updated annually. Once 
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these data are updated, these figures should be substituted for the 1970 
population and 1969 income figures presently used. 
It is also suggested that the new revenue sharing legislation (if 
any be forthcoming) require a negotiation process involving the local 
chief executive and a fair representation of all groups/segments likely 
to be affected by proposed programs. This would insure that needs and 
priorities of the least powerful groups in the community would be included 
in the planning process. 
It is up to Congress to write safeguards into any renewal of revenue 
sharing. Among other things, revenue sharing should be made more respon¬ 
sive to the needs of the poor, provide for greater citizen participation 
by recipients and contain detailed mechanisms for the federal government 
to withhold funds in cases of discrimination. These are the sorts of 
changes needed to make revenue sharing meet the legal and moral require¬ 




THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972 
Congress, on October 13, 1972, completed action on a bill (HR 14370) 
establishing a five-year program to share $30,236,400,000 in federal reve¬ 
nues with state and local governments. 
Final action came when the Senate, by a 59-19 roll-call vote, adopted 
a conference report (S Rept 92-1229) on the bill. The House had approved 
the report on October 12, 1972 by a 265-110 roll call. As cleared, the 
bill appropriated $30,236,400,000 to a special trust fund for distribution 
among state and local governments. The program, retroactive to January 1 
1972, at an initial annual level of $5-3 billion, would run until December 
31, 1976. 
The conference agreement represented a unique compromise between 
conflicting House and Senate provisions for allocating revenue-sharing 
funds. The conference agreement gave states the greater of two amounts 
available under the different formulas approved by the House and the 
Senate. The compromise averted a possible stalemate in choosing between 
the House formula, which favored less populous states. To distribute 
each stated revenue sharing funds among state local governments, however, 
the conference agreement generally followed the Senate bill. 
In another key compromise, the conferees dropped a Senate provision 
setting a $1.6 billion annual limit on federal grants to state and local 
governments for social services. Reporting the Senate limit in technical 
disagreement, conferees recommended a substitute amendment setting a $2.5 
billion limit on social services expenditures under existing matching 
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grant programs. Under the substitute, each state could receive only 
a proportion of $2.5 billion based on its population. 
Accepting a principle included in the House-passed version of HR 
14370, the conference agreement included a list of spending priorities for 
revenue-sharing funds turned over to local governments. The conference 
version, less restrictive than the House bi11, 'allowed local governments 
to use federal revenues for capital expenditures authorized by law and 
for ordinary operating and maintenance expenditures on public safety, 
environmental protection, public transportation, health, recreation, 
libraries, social services for the poor and aged and for financial ad- 
mini stration. 
Following the Senate version, the conference agreement subjected 
state as well as local governments to certain requirements for handling 
revenue sharing funds and provisions barring discrimination and applying 
federal wage standards to jobs and projects financed in large part by 
revenue sharing money. 
Final Provisions 
As cleared by Congress, HR 14370: 
Created a State and Local Government Fiscal Assistance Trust Fund 
to remain available without fiscal year limitation. Appropriated this 
money ($30 billion) to the Trust Fund from federal income tax revenues in 
the following amounts: 
(1) $2,650 for the period January 1-June 30, 1972. 
(2) $2,650 for July 1-December 31, 1972. 
(3) $2,987 for January 1-June 30, 1973* 
(4) $6,050 for fiscal 1974. 
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(5) $6,200 for fiscal 1975. 
(6) $6,350 for fiscal 1976. 
(7) $3»325 for the period July 1-December 31, 1976. 
Allocated to each state for each entitlement period the greater of 
two amounts computed by the following methods: 
(1) A three-factor formula allocating to each state an amount 
in the same ratio to $5.3 billion (the initial annual rate) as the figure 
produced by the state's population multiplied by its relative income was 
to the figure produced by the same factors for the nation as a whole. 
(2) A five-factor formula allocating (at an initial annual level 
of $5.3 billion) $3-5 billion among the states according to population 
(one-third), urbanized population (one-third) and population weighted by 
per capita income (one-third) and the remaining $1.8 billion according to 
individual income tax collections by state governments (one-half) and the 
general tax effort of state and local governments (one-half). 
Allocated one-third of each state's entitlement to the state govern¬ 
ment and the remaining two-thirds to local governments within the state. 
The local governments' two-thirds would be divided as follows: 
(1) Allocated to each county within a state an amount computed 
on the basis of population, tax effort and relative income. 
(2) Allocated to each county government an amount determined by 
the ratio of its tax collections to total tax collections by all govern¬ 
ments in the county. 
(3) Allocated among all township governments within a county a total 
amount determined by their combined share of tax collections, with each 
township's amount determined by population, tax effort and relative income. 
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(4) Allocated the remainder of the county's share among municipal 
governments according to population, tax effort and relative income. 
(5) Allocated part of a county area's allotment to the governing 
bodies of local Indian tribes or Alaskan native villages on the basis of 
population. 
Permitted states to legislate optional formulas for distributing 
local government funds by population and tax effort or by population 
and relative income, or by both. 
Increased revenue-sharing entitlements for Alaska and Hawaii by 
the same percentage as cost-of-living adjustments given federal employees 
in those non-contiguous states. 
Required that a state government's revenue-sharing entitlement be 
reduced if it reduced transfers of state funds to local governments. 
Required each government receiving revenue-sharing funds to submit 
to the secretary of the treasury and publish in local newspapers reports 
on the planned and actual uses of shared revenues. 
Prohibited discrimination by race, color, national origin or sex in 
any activity or program funded in whole or in part with revenue sharing 
money. 
Required that a state or local government employee be paid at the 
prevailing local wage, state or local minimum wage or federal minimum 
wage (whichever was highest) in cases where revenue-sharing funds made up 
25 percent or more of the employee's compensation. 
Applied the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act requirement that workers on federally 
funded construction projects receive prevailing local construction wages 
to projects for which 25 percent or more of the financing came from 
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revenue-sharing funds. 
Required local governments to use revenue-sharing funds only for 
"priority expenditures": capital expenditures authorized by law or main¬ 
tenance and operating expenditures on public safety (including law enforce¬ 
ment, fire protection and building code enforcement), environmental pro¬ 
tection (including sewage disposal, sanitation and pollution abatement), 
transportation (including transit systems and streets and roads), health, 
recreation, libraries, social services for the poor and aged, and finan¬ 
cial administration. 
Provided for collection by the federal government's Internal Revenue 
Service of state income taxes starting in the year after at least two 
states, whose residents together filed at least 5 percent of all federal 
income tax returns, requested such a service. 
And finally, placed a $2.5 billion ceiling on annual federal 75 
percent matching grants to state and local governments for social services, 
with each state limited to the same percentage of $2.5 billion as the 
percentage of its population to total U. S. population. 
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Counci 1 President Mayor 
Race 
Black       
White      
Sex 
Male       
Female      
Education 
Elementary      
High School      
Some College      
Baccalaureate     
Master's       
Doctorate     
Other       
Age 
35 & Under       
36 to 49      
50 and over       
Occupation 
Professional      
White Collar      
Semi Skilled       
Laborer      




BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICE HOLDERS 
in 
MACON COUNTY & TUSKEGEE, ALABAMA 
City County 
Council Commissioners Mayor 
Race 
Black       
White     
Other       
Sex 
Male       
Female     
Education 
Elementary       
High School     
Some College       
Baccalaureate    
Master's       
Doctorate     
Other       
Age 
35 & Under       
36 to 49     
50 & over       
Occupation 
Professional      
White     
Semi Skilled       
Laborer      
Entrepreneur      
Housewife      
Farmer      
Retired 
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EVALUATION OF GRS EXPENDITURES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
I. General Revenue Sharing (GRS) Allocations 
A. Amount of money allocated directly to Tuskegee in 
1972 , 1973 , and 1974 . 
Amount of money allocated directly to Macon County 
in 1972 , 1973 , and 1974  
B. Additional funds diverted to Tuskegee in 1973  
and 1974 . 
Additional funds diverted to Macon County in 1973. 
and 1974 . 
II. Other Allocations Related to the Use and Impact of GRS Funds. 
A. Allocations for Social Services (Amendment of Title XI 
of Social Security Act). For instance, allocation to 
day-care centers, community health, and aid to the 
elderly and disabled. 
1. Amount received by Tuskegee in 1972 , 
1973 , and 1974 . 
Amount received by Macon County in 1972 , 
1973 , and 1974 . 
2. Amount by which 19731s allocations exceeded or was 
less than 19721s funds for social services in 
Tuskegee  and Macon County . 
Amount by which 1974's allocations exceeded or was less 
than 19731s funds for social services in 
Tuskegee  and Macon County . 
3. (Opinion) Did 19731s allocations for social services 
meet the minimum need for such services in Tuskegee? 
Yes  No . For Macon County? Yes  No . 
Do you feel that this year*s allocations for social 
services will meet the minimum need for such services 
in Tuskegee? Yes  No . For Macon County? Yes 
No 
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B. Federal Categorical Programs 
1. Were there any federal categorical program grants 
eliminated or cut in 1973 in Tuskegee? Yes  No . 
For Macon County? Yes  No  
If yes, answer the following: 
a. How much was the reduction?  
b. In which general areas?  
2. Are any federal categorical program grants scheduled 
for elimination or reduction in 1974? Yes  No  
If yes, answer the following: 
a. How much will the reduction be?  
b. In which general areas?  
III. Local Expenditures from GRS Funds 
A. Use of Funds 
1. Announced plans for the use of GRS funds in Tuskegee 
for 1972  
1973   and 
4  
2. Actual use of GRS funds for Tuskegee in 
1972   
1973   and 
1974   
3. Extent to which actual use matched announce planned 
use of GRS funds in 1972  
1973  
and 1 4  
If any changes were made, why? 
B. Type of Expenditures 
1. Amount spent on capital expenditures in Tuskegee 
1972  , 1973 , and 1974  
2. Location of construction in Tuskegee for 1972  
1973   and 1974 . 
3. Accessibility to locations by various constituencies 
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4. Amount spent on operational expenditures in Tuskegee 
(for instance, salary increases, who received the 
increases? Administrative personnel—clerk, etc.— 
or garbage collectors, etc.) 
In 1972 , 1973 , and 1974  
C. Program areas and projects on which GRS funds spent 
1972 1973 1974 
Public Safety       
Environmental Protection       
Public Transportation       
Health       
Recreation       
Libraries       
Social Services 
aged and poor       
Financial Administration       
D. Non-GRS local expenditures potentially related to GRS 
expenditures 
1. Were there (or will there be) any sizeable increases 
in local expenditures in area not considered priority 
for the allocation of GRS funds, e.g., education? 
Yes  No . If yes, answer the following: 
a. What area(s) or project(s)? 1972  
 , 1973  and 
1974 . 
b. How much was the increase? 1972  
1973 , 1974  
2. How were these increased expenditures financed? 
1973 , 1974  
3. What were the objectives of the agency receiving 
increased funding?  
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4. Did the infusion of more money help meet the objectives? 
IV. Priority-Setting Process for use of GRS Funds 
A. Have GRS funds already been budgeted for the entire 
fiscal year of 1974? Yes  No  
1. How were priorities, if any established in '72, ’73 & '74? 
2. Was the priority-setting process publicized in either 
of the years? Yes  No . 
3. How does the council of government go about publicizing 
the budget? 
B. Community Involvement 
1. Extent of Community involvement 
1972 1973 1974 
Extensive in¬ 
volvement       
Minor involvement       
No involvement       
2. Community group(s) most interested and involved 
1972 1973 1974 
3. Process of Community involvement 





group present a 
plan 
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C. Within local government 
1. Extent of debate and deliberation within local 
government in setting priorities 
1972 1973 1974 
Extensive delibera¬ 
tion/debate       
Minor delibera¬ 
tion/debate       
No deliberation 
or debate       
2. Department or individuals responsible for coordi¬ 
nating process within local government. 
V. Equal Opportunity and Civil Rights Provisions 
A. Utilization of minority contractors and workers for 
capital expenditures 
1972 1973 1974 
Extensive Utilization       
Minor Utilization       
No Utilization       
Do you feel the money was used equitably? 
1972 1973 1974 
Yes       
No       
Did any sector threaten and/or file a complaint? 
1972 1973 1974 
Yes       
No       
If yes, what sector(s)? 
109 
VI. Local Taxation Effort and General Revenue Sharing Funds 
A. Any reduction of local effort as a result of GRS? 
1972 1973 1974 
Yes       
No       
If yes, what specific taxes were reduced? County  
Municipal (Tuskegee) . 
B. Any elimination of planned increased in local tax effort 
as a result of GRS? Yes  No  
VII. What do you consider to be greatest need of the City/County? 
VIII. How do you feel revenue sharing funds should be spent in your 
jurisdiction? In 1974-1975? (Indicate all of your preferences 
by placing number "1" by the appropriate category, a "2" 
by your second choice, etc.) 
A. To reduce taxes 
 B. To pay for current bills 
 C. To increase the level of current services (e.g., social 
services, public safety, etc.) 
 D. To reduce bonded indebtedness 
 E. To implement new programs. 
IX. Assessment of Impact and Effectiveness of GRS Funds 
A. Beneficiaries 
1. What constituencies benefited most from program 
and capital expenditures? 
In 1972  
In 3  
In 1974  
2. What constituencies benefited least from program 
and capital expenditures? 
In 1972  
In 3  
In 1974_  
no 
3. Specific benefits to poor, near poor and minorities 
from major categories of expenditures? 
Comparison with other constituencies. . . e.g., 
(if additional policemen were hired, were they 
black); if the renovation of parks, pavements of 
streets, fixing of street lights, did any of it 
take place in the poor, near poor and minorities 
communities? 
In 1972  
In 3  
In 1974  
B. Program Effectiveness 
1. Extent of quantitative and qualitative improvements 
in programs receiving GRS money 
In 1972  
In 3  
In 1974  
2. Were funds channelled to meet greatest needs . . . 
bringing greatest number of resources to the 
neediest? 
In 1972  
In 3  
In 1974  
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